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I. INTRODUCTION
Feminism is out of control. I recently attended an academic conference

on domestic violence where, as usual, the speakers and the audience were
virtually all women. As is to be expected, one woman or another lamented
the lack of male interest in matters affecting both sexes. Finally, a wellregarded male academic spoke up. However, he did not offer a fresh
perspective. Despite his years of research and scholarship in the field, he
cautioned that any comments he made must be considered with great
skepticism because of his sex. He apologized for being a man.
With a feminist narrative flourish, such a vignette illustrates that
feminism does more than shape and control the debate on gender issues.'

1. For recognition of the power of storytelling by feminists, see, for example, Linda Kelly,
Storiesfrom the Front:Seeking Refuge for BatteredImmigrants in the Violence Against Women
Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665,666 (1998) [hereinafter Kelly, Storiesfrom the Front].See also Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1991); Mar J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1190 n.26 (1991); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social
Change: The Power of Narrativein Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243,
1245 (1993).
The use of storytelling by feminism is consistent with feminism's preference for qualitative,
clinical studies rather than quantitative, empirical studies which are not believed to account for
contextual considerations. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Disabusingthe Definition of Domestic Abuse:
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Feminism silences the debate. No other theories can legitimately address
issues identified as "feminist." Feminism is a tautological success story.
Feminism defines the issues. Feminism limits the terms. Feminism dictates
the outcomes.
Yet despite feminism's hegemonic strength, feminist theory is on the
brink of self-annihilation. After waves of liberal, radical, and cultural
feminism, we are now riding a "third wave" of feminism that risks
crashing into nothingness.2 The permutations of feminist legal theory have
proliferated to the point of endangering feminism's existence. "Antiessentialist reader[s],"' half-finished manifestos,4 "multiplicative" identity
analyses,' intersectionality, 6 erotica theory,7 even the hint of a return to
liberalism 8-all are welcomed.
Yet if feminist theory has reached an amorphous, nearly extinct state,
how does it continue to command attention? What remains at the feminist

How Women BatterMen and the Role of the Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 791, 818-20
(2003) [hereinafter Kelly, Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Abuse] (examining feminist
criticisms of scientific studies on the female use of domestic violence). At the most abstract level,
feminism's support of narrative is also consistent with its criticism of liberalism's neutral quality.
For further discussion of feminism's critique of liberal theory, see infra Parts II.A., II.C.
2. For a discussion of the developments in feminist theory, see infra Part II.
3. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI-ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy E. Dowd & Michelle
S. Jacobs eds., 2003) (a collection of discussions devoted to the critique of feminism as
"essentialist"). For discussion of the essentialist critique of feminism, see infra Part II.D.
4. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, A PostmodernFeministLegalManifesto (An UnfinishedDraft),
105 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1992). The Harvard journal made a controversial decision to publish
Professor Frug's unfinished work after she was murdered. Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically
Correct Law Review Articles, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 233, 237-40 (1999). The circumstances
surrounding Professor Frug's death, the content of the article, and the journal's decision to publish
it in its unfinished form led to Professor Frug's article being dubbed the most politically correct law
review article. Id. For further discussion of Frug's work, see infra note 58 and accompanying text.
5. This term was coined by Adrien Wing to recognize the various factors (e.g., race, age,
wealth, nationality) that shape identity. Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction:Global CriticalRace
Feminismfor the Twenty-First Century, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 7 (Adrien Katherine
Wing ed., 2000).
6. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
ViolenceAgainst Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1243-45 (1991). For further discussion
of intersectionality, see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 181 (2001) (celebrating woman's sexual pleasure and critiquing
radical and cultural feminism's respective treatment of sex as an act of oppression or reproduction).
For further discussion of Franke's theory, see infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
8. Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265, 1267 (1993)
(reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katherine T. Bartlett &

Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)) (stating that the return to liberal feminism "offers law's best hope
for justice founded upon true social equality"). For further discussion of Dailey's theory, see infra
note 59 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

3

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57

core? What issues does feminism control? How has feminism distorted our
understanding of such issues? Who has been harmed by the distortion?
This Article tackles such questions in the context of sexual harassment
law and theory.9 Nearly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court endorsed the
feminist definition of sexual harassment in the landmark case of Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. " Accepting Catharine MacKinnon's
design," the Court recognized that sexual harassment occurs not only
when the conduct threatens a tangible employment benefit but also when
such conduct creates a "hostile working environment" because of a
person's sex.12 Meritorraised the sexual harassment claim of a woman in
the "quintessential" male aggressor and female victim fact pattern. 13 Yet
opposite-sex cases involving male victims and female aggressors, as well
as same-sex cases involving either sex, also exist. 4 Today, these
nontraditional cases remain unduly challenged by the control feminist
theory continues to wield. 5 Feminism defines sexual harassment.
Feminism limits the players. Feminism dictates the victors.
The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment undoes the circle of
sexual harassment law and theory. After observing the general trends in
feminist theory and the movement's current, potentially self-destructive
state in Part I, Part II compares the more particular feminist shape of sexual
harassment law. In combination with Part IIl's examination of recent
feminist theory in the sexual harassment area, it makes clear that feminism
remains alive and influential as a matter of law and theory. Despite strong
postmodern efforts at the highest meta level of theory, feminism cannot
abandon its patriarchal core. Notwithstanding the infinite differences
between women, feminism maintains that all women are controlled by
men. Sexual harassment law and theory is grounded in this basic feminist
tenet. Sexual harassment's two critical elements of causation and severity
9. I have previously written on feminist control of domestic violence law and theory. Kelly,
Disabusing the Definition of DomesticAbuse, supra note 1.
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. MacKinnon constructed the two-prong quid pro quo or hostile environment definition
of sexual harassment in an important work written several years earlier. CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1-2 (1979). For discussion of Catharine
MacKinnon's role in Meritor and her ongoing influence on sexual harassment law and theory, see
infra Parts II.A.-B.
12. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 64. For further discussion of the development of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, see infra Part III.
13. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 59-60; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,1686 (1998). For further discussion of the feminist influence on
Meritor, see infra Part III.B.
14. For further discussion of the existence and the frequency of such claims, see infra notes
336-38 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of the legal standard set for "nontraditional" sexual harassment
cases, see infra Parts IV.A, IV.C-VI.A.
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continue to be distorted by the feminist misspeak. Parts IV and V evidence
such distortion by respectively reviewing the treatment of causation and
severity in law and theory. As Part VI recognizes, feminism challenges
men in both the opposite-sex and same-sex context. Yet women are also
injured. In the interest of women and men, Part VII urges the recognition
and elimination of the feminist misspeak of sexual harassment.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN FEMINIST THEORY

A. LiberalFeminism
Feminist legal theory originated in the 1960s with the feminist
movement's effort to achieve formal equality for women.16 With its
reliance on liberal theory, liberal feminism expects women, like men, to be
rational beings who want nothing more than individual autonomy. 7 Such
liberty can best be achieved by preventing state interference with one's
pursuit of self unless such pursuit is in turn interfering with the liberty of
another.'" Combined, these principles of rational behavior, individual
autonomy, self interest, and liberty demand state neutrality toward its
citizenry.' 9 Consequently, any barriers erected by the state that hinder
according women the same privileges and rights as men must be removed.

16. The beginnings of feminist legal theory are associated with the entrance of a large number
of women into the legal academy and feminism's "Second Wave." The "Second Wave" is culturally
associated with Gloria Steinem. See Rachel F. Morah, How Second- Wave Feminism Forgot the
Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 223, 268-69 (2004). The "First Wave" is associated with the
women's suffrage movement. Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts:
An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209, 209 (1998).
17. See, e.g., CHRIs BEASLEY, WHAT Is FEMINISM?: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST THEORY
51-53 (1999). For a general review of liberal feminism, see, for example, HILAIRE BARNETT,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 121-34 (1998); Dailey, supra note 8, at 1267-69;
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Feminist Public Policy and Feminist
Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE 11, 16-23 (Leslie Friedman
Goldstein ed., 1992). For more critical examinations, see generally Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic
Man " Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171
(1992) (recognizing the liberal strands of feminism); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence ofFeminist
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986) (discussing the evolution from liberalism to
feminism); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) (arguing for the integration of feminism and liberalism); Robin L. West,
Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REv. 43 (1990) (arguing for the integration of feminism
and liberalism).
18. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 122; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 493, 495-97 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
19. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 122-23; West, supra note 18, at 496. While I acknowledge
the risk of oversimplifying liberal theory by reducing it to such basic principles, any deeper
discussion of liberalism is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Despite a string of feminist successes credited to liberal theory, the
theory also proves divisive for feminism. 20 While liberal feminists demand
that women be treated "just like men," where differences between men and
women are characterized as a natural or social condition rather than as a
product of affirmative state action, liberalism's principle of neutrality
prohibits any state corrective effort.
B. CulturalFeminism
This formidable sameness/difference challenge led the Supreme Court
to reason that protection against sex discrimination does not extend to
prevent the disparate treatment of pregnant women. 21 For feminist theory,
the response to the sameness/difference question was the creation of two
extremes.22 At one end of the continuum stands the relational or cultural
strand which celebrates female "difference." Unlike men, who operate
under a liberal standard of autonomy and an "ethic of justice," women
behave in a relational manner, adopting an "ethic of care."23 Such

20. In the legal arena, liberal feminism has brought significant legislative changes including
such achievements as the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX in 1972,
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975. Goldstein, supra note 17, at 12. Likewise, in 197 1,
the Supreme Court rendered a series of important decisions including Reed v. Reed, which
disavowed the belief that men and women belonged in separate spheres. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (197 1).
For further discussion of the judicial achievements of liberal feminism, see generally Wendy W.
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, andFeminism, in FEMINIST
LEGALTHEORY: READINGS IN LAWANDGENDER 15 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds.,
1991).
21. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
494 (1974). For a sampling from the extensive literature on the treatment of pregnancy within the
sameness/difference debate see, for example, RUTH COLKER, PREGNANT MEN: PRACTICE, THEORY,
AND THE LAW (1994) (attempting to combine theory and practice on the issue of abortion);
Goldstein, supra note 17, at 12-15; Scales, supra note 17, at 1396-99; Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 128 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) (arguing that "equal treatment"
of pregnant wage earners is superior to "special treatment").
22. For a collection of perspectives on the debate, see, for example, FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: THE DIFFERENCE DEBATE, supra note 17. For the cultural and radical feminist

positions respectively, see infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text and Part III.C.
23. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEVELOPMENT 62-63, 164 (1982) (providing a heavy influence for cultural or relational feminism).
Yet interestingly, while the beginnings of relational feminism and its promotion of the female as
inherent nurturer are invariably traced to Carol Gilligan, Gilligan believed that a woman could
achieve real fulfillment only by developing beyond the relational identity, ultimately combining
individual rights with responsibilities. For reliance on Carol Gilligan's work to support relational
feminism's basic advocacy of care, see, for example, West, supra note 18, at 500-04. For
acknowledgment of the more developed nuances of Gilligan's theory, see, for example, Kenneth
L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, DUKE L.J. 447, 480-85 (1984). See also, Scales, supra note 17
(rejecting the belief that philosophies ofjustice (right) and care can be combined, and advocating law's
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behavioral observations allow relational feminists to argue that special
legal accommodations be made for women on account of their caregiving
nature.24
C. RadicalFeminism
Declaring "Radical feminism is feminism,, 25 Catharine MacKinnon
rejects all other forms of feminism and creates the other extreme. Liberal
and cultural feminism are both inherently flawed. For MacKinnon, the two
theories simply hold up opposite sides of the sameness/difference debate,
and ultimately, each depends upon liberal theory-which is inherently
male.26
Radical feminism attacks liberalism's central principle of neutrality.
Rather than ensuring the law's equal treatment of the sexes, state neutrality

transformation to a relational approach).
For further discussion of cultural feminism, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams, The Second
Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1605 (2001) (offering a contrasting perspective on the
reemergence of care); Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A
Critique of MacKinnon 's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247 (1990)
(reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989))

(criticizing MacKinnon's program as not fully developed); McClain, supra note 17 (looking at the
model of "atomistic man" who is claimed to be at the root of liberalism and the legal system);
Scales, supra note 17 (illustrating the difficulty of seeing solutions to inequality through
abstractions); Sherry, supra note 17 (contending that modem men and women have distinctly
different perspectives on the world); West, supra note 18, at 494.
24. This support for "special" accommodations would provide, for example, for workplace
accommodations of women's caregiving. See generallyMartha Albertson Fineman, Crackingthe
FoundationalMyths: Independence,Autonomy, and'Self-Sufficiency, in FEMINIST LEGALTHEORY:
AN ANTI-ESSENTALIST READER, supra note 3, at 200 (arguing for a "theory of collective
responsibility for dependency").
Beyond insisting upon the unique legal treatment of women, relational feminists also suggest
that the law adopt an ethic of care in a more general fashion. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 23, at
1607-09; Mary Becker, CareandFeminists,17 WIS. WOMEN'SL.J. 57,59-64 (2002). This position
has further divided relational feminists, and some suggest that feminism should supplement existing
law, for example, by allowing the notion of care to dictate such changes as the adoption of a duty
to rescue in tort. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 905-07 (discussing application of feminist
themes in particular areas of law). Others have argued more aggressively for the law to be
transformed entirely, guided wholly by the ethic of care. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 223
(1995) (arguing that the "mother-child dyad" should be emulated by women and men and replace
the sexual dyad as the basic family structure); McClain, supra note 17, at 1183, 1238-39
(recognizing the two approaches within relational feminism but supporting complete
transformation); Scales, supra note 17, at 1385-86 (supporting complete transformation). For a
further feminist discussion of torts, see infra note 310.
25. MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 117.
26. See id.
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instead preserves man's existing dominant position. 27 Because a liberal
state can address gender inequality only when the state affirmatively
disregards the neutrality principal and acts in favor of male interests, all
socially or biologically generated inequalties are justified as beyond the
liberal state's reach. 28 The liberal state is thus at its worst when it is most
neutral.29
Radical feminism eliminates the need for overt state discriminatory
action as a condition precedent to state corrective action. The state is
expected to respond to both public and private discriminatory acts, as both
are by-products of male power, which the state perpetuates through its
ongoing advocacy of liberal theory.3" Radical feminism exposes privacy as
a mechanism for protecting "a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress
women one at a time.'
Radical feminism boldly takes on the prevalence of male power not
only within the legal system but throughout society.32 It recognizes that
such power is achieved through the male control of gender. Distinguished
from biological sex, gender is a social construct used to cast women as
men's subordinates. 34 "Women and men are divided by gender, made into

27. See id. at 248.
28. Id.
29. "When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male; when it is most sex blind, it is most
blind to the sex of the standard being applied." Id.
30. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
100 (1987). For a sampling from the terrific amount of literature discussing the private/public
dichotomy, see generally THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (a collection of
essays devoted to eliminating the dismissal of domestic violence as a private harm); Cheryl Hanna,
No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1869-77, 1907 (1996) (recognizing the effort to destroy the divide through
the aggressive prosecution of domestic violence as a public crime); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 1115 (attributing society's denial ofdomestic violence to the public/private dichotomy); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialecticof Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 645-48 (1986) (describing the growing characterization of domestic violence
as a public crime); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal
Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1070-73 (1996) (recognizing the
development of the spousal immunity doctrine within the public/private framework); Reva B.
Siegel, "The Rule ofLove": Wife Beatingas PrerogativeandPrivacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119,
2154-55 (1996) (reviewing the historical treatment of domestic violence as a right of privacy and
the "modernization" of such arguments which allow for the perpetuation of domestic violence).
31. MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 102 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890)).
32. The focus on a sphere of power rather than on a particular institutional system is a critical
difference between radical and liberal feminism. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 134.
33. MACKNNON, supra note 23, at 110-11.
34. Gender is a "learned trait, an acquired characteristic, an assigned status, with qualities that
vary independent of biology and an ideology that attributes them to nature." Id. at 109. Because
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the sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of its dominant
form, heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and
female sexual submission."35 A woman's sexuality is measured only by her
ability to arouse desire in a man.36 The act of sexual intercourse is the
original means by which man oppresses women.37 "[A]natomy is
destiny."38
Radical feminism irreversibly alters the feminist perspective. If a
woman's entire being is controlled by male desire, the female "differences"
of nurture and care celebrated by cultural feminism are nothing more than
virtues imposed on women by men. Protecting such differences, thus, only
perpetuates women's inferiority. "Difference is the velvet glove on the iron
fist of domination."39 Likewise, the "sameness" cries of liberal feminism
keep women subordinate to men to the extent that "sameness" translates
into an aspiration to imitate male qualities.'
Radical feminism demands a shift in the terms of the debate-from
terms of sameness and difference to terms of dominance and
subordination. 4 Our society's patriarchal infrastructure dictates every
aspect of our behavior, including most significantly, the sexes' relations.
If the "male pursuit of control over women's sexuality" is "definitive,"'42
the subordination of women is all-pervasive. "[C]onceiving nature, law,
the family, and roles as consequences, not as foundations, feminism
fundamentally
identifies sexuality as the primary social sphere of male
43
power.

such a characterization effectively makes both sexes society's victims, I use the terms gender and
sex interchangeably throughout this Article. For further recognition of the victimization of radical
feminism in general critiques of feminism, see infranotes 44-49 and accompanying text. For similar
criticisms of sexual harassment's victimization of men and women through its adoption of feminist
theory, see infra notes 326-47 and accompanying text.
35. MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 113.
36. Id. at 118.
37. See id. at 110-11.
38. Id. at 54.
39. Id. at 219.
40. Id. at 220-21. To the extent gender is socially constructed, MacKinnon also recognizes
the male gender as a social construct. Id. at 112.
41. Id. at 242. MacKinnon states:
In this approach, inequality is a matter not of sameness and difference, but of
dominance and subordination. Inequality is about power, its definition, and its
maldistribution. Inequality at root is grasped as a question ofhierarchy, which-as
power succeeds in constructing social perception and social reality---derivatively
becomes categorical distinctions, differences.
Id.
42. Id. at 112.
43. Id. at 109.
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D. The EssentialistCritique ofRadical and CulturalFeminism
Yet while radical feminism is applauded for its "relentless insistence"
on the gender hierarchy's ubiquity, critics attack the theory for
"essentializing" woman as the perpetual sexual victim.45 Of course, the
essentializing critique is not unique to radical feminism. While radical
feminism characterizes all gender connections and their physical origins
as oppressive, cultural feminism's celebration of exactly those ties renders
it vulnerable to the charge of denying women an identity beyond
motherhood.'
Yet while the essentializing nature of radical and cultural feminism is
quite different, with the radical strain repressing all women into
victimhood and the cultural strain elevating all women into motherhood,
they strike a similar chord. Radical and cultural feminism share a
preoccupation with sex, reducing it either to a point of "danger" or
"dependency." '7 In one way or another, women's bodies are being used
against them. Intercourse is either a product of coercion or a means of
achieving children. 8 It is never simply an act of intimacy-of human
pleasure.4 9 Moreover, neither theory recognizes the many other factors that
shape a woman's identity. The woman of radical or cultural theory does
not represent all women but rather those women who have assumed all the
advantages of being part of the white middle class." Radical and cultural
feminist theories are called upon to account for other life-defining
distinctions such as race, ethnicity, class, and age. 5' Such combined factors

44. Cornell, supra note 23, at 2248.
45. See BARNETT, supra note 17, at 173; Abrams, supra note 23, at 1611; Cornell, supra note
23, at 2248; Franke, supra note 7, at 199; West, supra note 18, at 499-500.
46. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 148-57; Franke, supra note 7, at 183; McClain, supra note
17, at 1184-86. For further discussion of cultural feminism, see supra Part II.B. For further
discussion of radical feminism, see supra Part II.C.
47. Franke, supra note 7, at 182. Yet even Franke's essentialist criticism maintains a degree
of essentialism as it presumes a woman's heterosexuality. See id. at 183. For a discussion of the
essentialism challenge posed to feminism by lesbianism and bisexuality, see, for example,
BARNETT, supra note 17, at 189-94; Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the
Theories, BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191,213 (1989-90).
48. See Franke, supra note 7, at 199.
49. See id.
50. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 189-94; Goldstein, supra note 17, at 26-31.
51. Kimberle Crenshaw powerfully explains how women of color are marginalized at the
intersection of gender with race, class, and immigration status. Crenshaw, supranote 6, at 1246-48;
see DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL

HARASSMENT 6 (1995); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
INFEMINIST THOUGHT IX (1988); Cornell, supra note 23, at 2263; Kelly, Storiesfrom the Front,
supra note 1, at 672-82.
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women face.5 2
provide the complete understanding of the discrimination
53
"[F]emininity ... must always be modified.
E. PostmodernFeminism
On the crest of such criticisms, feminism has now entered its "Third
Wave," where postmodern existentialism thrives. 4 Rejecting the "meta
theory" or single truth approach, postmodern feminism denies that gender
(and whatever positive or negative images society conjures from it)
constitutes the single axis on which society revolves." Like women, their
lives, their interaction with society and the state, their relations with men
and their sources of power and disempowerment are
and with each other,
56
multidimensional.
Yet pushing postmodem feminism's anti-essentialist critique to its
limits threatens self-destruction. We are left standing at the edge of an
"epistemological abyss," where the infinity of difference defies defining
woman, thereby rendering feminism an intellectual impossibility. 57
Postmodern purists, following the example of Mary Joe Frug, embrace
such chaos. "Only when sex means more than male or female, only when
the word 'woman' cannot be coherently understood, will oppression by sex
be fatally undermined."5' At the other postmodern extreme are those who
seem ready to abandon legal feminism and return full-circle to liberal

52. For more on the postmodern critique, see infra Part II.E.
53. Cornell, supra note 23, at 2263.
54. Regina Austin & Elizabeth M. Schneider, MaryJoe Frug'sPostmodernFeminist Legal
Manifesto Ten Years Later: Reflections on the State of Feminism Today, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1,
3 (2001) (discussing feminism's "Third Wave"). For the distinctions between the "First" and
"Second" Waves of feminism, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., BEASLEY, supra note 17, at 81. In this regard, postmodem feminism fits well
within the general postmodern movement's rejection of such theories as liberalism and marxism for
their respective assertions that human rationality or economic power are single organizing
principles around which society is formed. For further discussion of the general postmodern
movement and feminism, see, for example, BARNETT, supra note 17, at 182-87; BEASLEY, supra
note 17, at 81-89.
56. For a general discussion ofpostmodern feminism, see, for example, BARNETT,supra note
17, at 177-207; BEASLEY, supra note 17, at 81-116; FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTIESSENTIALIST READER, supra note 3 (providing a collection of postmodern feminist essays);

Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1243 (arguing that violence against women of color is often caused by
intersecting patterns of racism and feminism); Goldstein, supra note 17, at 27-29; Deborah L.
Rhode, FeministCriticalTheories,in FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE 594,595 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)
(examining the relationship between feminist critical theory and other forms of critical legal theory).
57. Dailey, supra note 8, at 1273. For further recognition of postmodernism as the "grand
theory of non-theory," see also BARNETT, supra note 17, at 187.
58. Frug, supra note 4, at 1075.
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theory, thereby following the path of many women outside the academy
who reject any identification with feminism.5
F. Maintainingthe Feminist Core
Today, postmoderns and liberals alike seem poised to explode
feminism. Feminism has over-essentialized. It has homogenized,
victimized, and maternalized. And yet, despite the endless permutations of
feminism and the promises of the extremes, a center holds. A "relentless
insistence ' to retain legal feminism's most central tenet remains. "The
gender hierarchy is omnipresent."'" Women are always the victims. Men
are always the aggressors. The law must recognize and eliminate this allpervasive power that men everywhere wield. These binding feminist
principles are evident in the development and current state of sexual
harassment law and theory. Feminism conceived both sexual harassment
law and theory. And in the twenty-five years since sexual harassment's
conception, feminism remains its guiding force.
III.

THE FEMINIST CONCEPTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A. CatharineMacKinnon: Feminist Theory
While sexual harassment is housed within Title VH of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as an act of sex discrimination, Congress did not originally
contemplate prohibiting any form of sex discrimination.62 Protecting "sex"
was a strategic afterthought, added to the protected classes of race, color,
59. See, e.g., Austin & Schneider, supra note 54, at 7 (recognizing and cautioning against the
postmodern feminist's rejection of any association with feminism); Dailey, supra note 8, at 1285
(arguing that feminism and liberalism share so many principles that feminism is in effect just
"[e]mpathetic liberalism"); Cynthia V. Ward, The Radical FeministDefense of Individualism, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 871 (1995) (suggesting liberalism and feminism's common goals of equality,
respect, and self-development renders feminist theory unnecessary).
60. Drucilla Cornell characterizes MacKinnon's recognition of the pervasiveness of the
gender hierarchy in this manner. Cornell, supra note 23, at 2248.
61. Kelly, Disabusingthe Definition ofDomestic Abuse, supranote 1, at 818 (recognizing
how the patriarchal understanding of law and society has determined domestic violence law and
theory).
62. Pursuant to Title VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/1
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religion, and national origin in an effort to defeat the entire measure one
day before the legislation passed the House.63 Not surprisingly then, the
concept of sexual harassment law is also not a legislative brainchild. The
term is credited to Working Women United, a feminist group, which
defined sexual harassment as "'the treatment of women workers as sexual
objects."'" From such beginnings, the term has remained under feminist
control.6" The development of sexual harassment as a legal theory and its
placement within Title VII are credited entirely to Catharine A.
MacKinnon.66
With her 1979 release of Sexual Harassment of Working Women,
Catharine MacKinnon shaped the feminist contours of harassment as a
legal theory and provided the necessary legal link between harassment and
discrimination. 6 7"Sexual harassment, most broadly defined... [is] the
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power." 68 Against this backdrop of disparate
distribution ofpower, sexual harassment took on the discriminatory quality
necessary to be anchored in Title VII. Yet the use and misuse of power,
even under MacKinnon's broadest definition, always remains controlled
by gender. Every aspect of our lives--our social, familial, employment,
education, and legal settings-is built upon a patriarchal framework.
"Intimate violation of women by men is sufficiently pervasive in American
society as to be nearly invisible.'6 9 Because men control the workforce, it
follows that only women are vulnerable to sexual harassment.7 °
63. On the lack oflegislative history in support of prohibiting sex discrimination, see Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (recognizing, because of the last minute
addition of sex and the legislative opposition, that "we are left with little legislative history to guide
us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex"'). See also Anita
Bernstein, TreatingSexual Harassmentwith Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445,474 & n. 171 (1997);
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIVES 755,
756 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996).
64. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1685 n.2 (quoting Dierdre Silverman, Sexual Harassment:
Working Women's Dilemma, QUEST: FEMINIST Q., Winter 1976-1977, at 15).
65. Noting the influence of feminists generally, see, for example, Bernstein, supra note 63,
at 446; Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 693
(1997).
66. On the characterization ofCatharine MacKinnon as the mastermind of sexual harassment,
see, for example, Sexual Harassment:Introduction, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
TO WOMEN'S LIVES, supra note 63, at 725, 729 (finding MacKinnon to be "probably the most
famous scholar" on sexual harassment and the notable "exception" in terms of providing a legal
theory); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 717-18 (1998).
67. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 11 (describing the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the work place and the expectation that women will not speak up in their own
defense).
68. Id. at 1.
69. Id. (footnote call number omitted).
70. Id.
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With this feminist model, MacKinnon designed the now fully accepted,
dual-parameter definition of sexual harassment: that it may take the obvious
form of a quid pro quo direct exchange of sex for economic benefit or the less
apparent but equally objectionable form of a hostile work environment.71
MacKinnon's work clearly advanced the legal theory of sexual
discrimination by forcing the inclusion of the reality of sexual harassment.
However, beyond characterizing sexual harassment as a means of
disempowerment, MacKinnon's sexual harassment theory also relies on her
fundamental message: power and its most basic weapon, sex, are controlled
and misused exclusively by men. 72 Sexual harassment merely imitates "the
inequitable social
structure of male supremacy and female
73
subordination."

71. As MacKinnon described:
Sexual harassment may occur as a single encounter or as a series
of incidents
at work. It may place a sexual condition upon employment opportunities at a
clearly defined threshhold, such as hiring, retention, or advancement; or it may
occur as a pervasive or continuing condition of the work environment.
Id. at 2. Subsequently, the EEOC regulations similarly stated:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2004).
For the Supreme Court's adoption of the twofold definition of sexual harassment, see Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). For discussion of Meritor and the courts'
adoption of this definition, see infra Part III.B.
72. MacKinnon states:
Sexuality, then, is a form ofpower. Gender, as socially constructed, embodies
it, not the reverse. Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as
we know them, by the social requirements of its dominant form, heterosexuality,
which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female sexual submission. If
this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality.
MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 113.

73. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 235.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/1
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B. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson: Feminist Law
MacKinnon presented such arguments as plaintiff's co-counsel in the
seminal case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.7 4 In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court rejected the employer's defense that Title VII
contemplated only quid pro quo actions, and it extended Title VII to
75
recognize MacKinnon's hostile work environment theory.
Notwithstanding the lack of economic injury, the Court reasoned that
sexual harassment occurs when the harasser's conduct is both
"unwelcome" 76 and "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' 7 7 Being forcibly raped, being fondled in front of other
employees, having to witness the harasser exposing himself, as well as
having sex forty to fifty times with the harasser were amongst the

74. MacKinnon also wrote the brief. MeritorSav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 58. For further
discussion of Meritor and MacKinnon's work on the case, see Sexual Harassment:Introduction,
supra note 66, at 730.
75. While the Meritor Court acknowledged that sex was added to Title VII immediately
before its passage, thus precluding any real legislative history on sex discrimination, the Court
dismissed the employer's argument that Congress intended harassment claims to be limited to
claims of economic injury and proceeded to infer that the statute was intended to extend beyond
tangible injury cases. MeritorSav.Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 63-64. For discussion of Title VII's lack
of legislative history on sex discrimination, see supranotes 62-63 and accompanying text.
The Court also took note of the previous recognition of hostile environment claims in the
instance of race and national origin claims and drew an analogy between such cases and sexual
harassment. MeritorSav.Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 65-67 (relying on Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1971) (marking the first case of hostile environment by recognizing hostility directed at
employee as a result of employer's discriminatory treatment of business's hispanic clientele)); id.
at 66-67 (relying on Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (stating that to
"run a gauntlet" of abusive sexual conduct at work is as bad as racial abuse)).
76. Unwelcome is distinct from involuntary. "The correct inquiry is whether respondent by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 68.
77. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). Meritor also set a
general standard necessitating notice and internal grievance procedures, thereby effectively limiting
employer liability to instances of actual or constructive knowledge. See id. at 72; cf id. at 75-76
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (setting a strict liability standard that does not consider
notice for sexual harassment committed by a supervisory employee). For more recent Supreme
Court treatment of employer liability, see generally BurlingtonIndustries,Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998) (examining whether an employee who suffers sexual harassment but does not suffer
tangible job consequences can recover against an employer without showing that the employer is
at fault for the supervisor's actions), and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)
(defining the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment by
a supervisor). For regulatory treatment of employer liability, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d)-(g) (2004).
See also Storrow, supra note 66, at 683 n.30 (discussing variety of employer liability cases). For
confirmation of unwelcomeness, severity, causation, and employer liability as the principal four
elements of sexual harassment, see infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the circuits'
adoption of these elements).
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conditions existing in Meritorthat could give rise to a hostile environment
claim.78 Concluding "[w]ithout question" that both quid pro quo and
hostile environment claims constitute sexual discrimination, the Supreme
Court endorsed one of the most fundamental aspects of MacKinnon's
work. 79 But what position did the Court take on sexual harassment's
feminist underpinnings, that harassment was both a cause and effect of our
patriarchal society?
According to MacKinnon, sexual harassment simultaneously
subordinates women "by using her employment position to coerce her
sexually, while using her sexual position to coerce her economically. 80
Meritorthus presented the "quintessential" feminist case-male supervisor
coercing female subordinate into sexual relations.8" Consequently, without
a case outside the classic feminist model, it is difficult to know what
influence, if any, the feminist subordination theme had upon the Meritor
Court.82 Meritorjustmight not have presented the best opportunity for the
Supreme Court to definitively state the boundaries of its own sexual
harassment theory.
These questions about the law's direction naturally point us back to
looking at the development of legal theory. In the nearly twenty years since
Meritorand the twenty-five years since the creation of sexual harassment
as a legal theory, there have been numerous opportunities for both law and
theory to clearly reject the original sexist position. While law and theory
influence one another, each is independently capable ofrecognizing sexual
harassment as power-wielding by both sexes against either sex,
unrestrained by the feminist-described social and biological forces, which
make only men capable of sexual aggression and then only to maintain the
gender hierarchy. Staking out such a substantive position should be
welcomed, as it would be consistent with modem theoretical critiques of
feminism and purported efforts to advance the theory. 3 Yet, the legacy of
patriarchy remains clearly evident in sexual harassment theory. 4 And

78. MeritorSav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 60.
79. See id. at 64.
80. MACKINNON, supra note 11, at 7.
81. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1686.
82. The lack of Meritor'sdiscussion of the theory used to support it's recognition of sexual
harassment under Title VII also has led others to attempt to fill the gap. See, e.g., Franke, supra
note 65, at 692 (suggesting two explanations for the Meritor decision: that eitherthe Court engaged
in "an avoidance technique" because it was unable to admit to acceptance of MacKinnon's
conflation of sex with subordination, or the Court intuitively recognized such sexual conduct as
discrimination without needing to articulate a theory).
83. For a discussion of such criticisms of radical feminism, see infra notes 340-60 and
accompanying text.
84. Sexual Harassment:Introduction,supranote 66, at 726 (acknowledging the recognition
of the women's movement of sexual harassment as a feminist issue); Franke, supra note 65, at 763
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despite the law's theoretical freedom, feminist control over sexual
harassment has allowed feminist themes to continue to resonate in sexual
harassment law.
IV. THE FEMINIST GROWTH OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW AND THEORY: THE CAUSATION ELEMENT

In the late 1990s, sexual harassment gained renewed attention in law
and theory. In both cases, the increased attention was sparked by growing
confusion as to the meaning of sexual harassment." Dubbed sexual
harassment's "second generation,"86 four leading feminist scholars
a "new jurisprudence,"87 address the
by attempting to develop
responded
'
8
8
9
"wrong, "reconceptualize," or come up with yet another language of
"treatment." 90 Initially, none of these well-regarded scholars seems solidly
aligned with MacKinnon's "first generation" of sexual harassment theory.
Yet ultimately, each scholar reaffirms and broadens the original feminist
theme that sexual harassment law is intended to dismantle the patriarchal
structure governing the workplace.
The publication of the second generation's theories virtually coincided
with the announcement of three major Supreme Court decisions on sexual
harassment. Although BurlingtonIndustries,Inc. v. Ellerth9' and Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton92 focused on the standard for employer liability,

(recognizing sexual harassment's patriarchal undercurrent, male sexuality); Vicki Schultz, The
Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2078 (2003) (recognizing feminist emphasis on the
connection of male power and sexuality in both quid pro quo and hostile environment case law);
David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1776 n.336 (2002) (conceding that Title VII has been used on
occasion to reach "seemingly benign, but paternalistic differential treatment").
85. See Schwartz, supranote 84, at 1703.
86. The "first" and "second" generation ofsexual harassment is a characterization ofthe Fifth
Circuit's Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham. Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263,267-68
(5th Cir. 1998). The "second generation" of sexual harassment scholars is identified with four
principal works. See Kathryn Abrams, The New JurisprudenceofSexual Harassment,83 CORNELL
L. REv. 1169 (1998); Bernstein, supra note 63; Franke, supra note 65; Schultz, supra note 13. I
am grateful to David Schwartz for bringing these scholars and the Butler case to my attention.
Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1700 n.13, 1701 n.19. I ultimately, however, do not agree with
Schwartz's minimization of the influence of these particular works or feminist theories on sexual
harassment law. For my examination of Schwartz's work, see infra note 118 and accompanying
text.
87. Abrams, supra note 86, at 1171.
88. Franke, supra note 65, at 693.
89. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1769-74.
90. See generally Bernstein, supra note 63 (criticizing the use of the reasonable person
standard in sexual harassment cases and proposing the "respectful person standard").
91. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
92. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.93 addressed the theoretical

concerns of the second generation. And in so doing, Oncale confirms the
Court's own feminist stance.
At first, Oncale may seem an odd case to evidence the feminist hold.
Oncale recognizes that Title VIl's prohibition against sexual
discrimination includes the protection of an individual subjected to
harassment by a person of the same sex.9" By deeming same-sex sexual
harassment claims actionable, one might deduce that the Supreme Court
had rejected feminists' patriarchal theme. Indeed, previous decisions of
lower courts had rejected similar same-sex claims based upon the assertion
that Title VII's protection was solely intended to protect women.95 Oncale
conceded that the congressional purpose behind Title VII "was assuredly
not" the prevention of "male-on-male sexual harassment."96 However, it
reasoned that the statutory language could be extended to include such
claims.9 7

Like the second generation theories, Oncale was an effort to respond
to unanswered questions regarding the purpose of sexual harassment. Yet
despite its general emphasis on the gender-neutral nature of Title VII, the
Court's particular emphasis on both the "causation" and "severity"
elements of hostile environment claims implicitly endorsed the feminist
permutation urged by the second generation: support gender neutrality in
theory, but demand patriarchal particulars in fact.98 A review of the case

93. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
94. Id. at 79.
95. Id. (noting the disagreement in the circuits regarding the intended group protected by
Title VII's "because of. .. sex" provision) (omission in original). In denying the actionability of
same-sex claims prior to Oncale, several courts clearly accepted MacKinnon's position that Title
VII's sexual discrimination provision was intended soley to protect women. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d. 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying same-sex claims by limiting Title
VII to "gender discrimination"). For a fuller discussion of the influence of feminism's patriarchal
theory on the Seventh Circuit prior to Oncale, see Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456
(N.D. 11. 1988) ("The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title VII is
one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which
results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."); Storrow, supranote 66, at 70515.
Of course, it should be remembered that the Meritor Court had earlier acknowledged the
difficulty in discerning a feminist legislative intent or any intent in Title VII given the last minute
addition of "because of... sex" in Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 6364 (1986); see also supra notes 62-63, 65 and accompanying text (discussing the political
motivations and history behind Title VII).
96. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
97. Id. at 79-80.
98. The "causation" and "severity" elements are two ofthe four elements typically associated
with sexual harassment cases based on hostile environment. A plaintiff must prove that 1) the
conduct was "unwelcome"; 2) such conduct occurred "because of... sex"; 3) the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of employment; and 4) the employer bears
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law and theories leading up to Oncale, as well as cases decided after
Oncale, evidences the ongoing feminist misspeak of sexual harassment.
A. The Circuitsand the "Sex PerSe " Standardof Causation
The causation element or "because of... sex" requirement of sexual
harassment was not a focus of the Supreme Court prior to Oncale.Meritor
had offered no clear guidance, although its facts supported the original
expectation that causation requires the conduct to be sexual in nature and
motivated by sexual desire.9 9 But as the reasoning in Meritor further
supported, the presumptively female victims in opposite-sex cases are not
expected to go to great evidentiary lengths to meet the causation burden.
If such a traditional, male-on-female case involves sexual conduct, it is
"[w]ithout question" an instance of sexual discrimination."
Encouraged by Meritor's lack of explicit direction, several courts
eventually eliminated the sexual desire or intent prong, thereby narrowing
the causation element to a question of whether the conduct was sexual in
nature.' 01 With the development of this "sex per se" standard, a variety of

liability. See, e.g., Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999); Spicer v. Va.
Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Other courts include a somewhat
redundant fifth element of having to prove membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Davis v.
Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181
F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th
Cir. 1997); Bohen v. City of E. Chi., 799 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982); see also Abrams, supra note 86, at 1221 & n.26 1;
Storrow, supra note 66, at 685 & n.36-40. While all the elements have been subject to feminist
interpretation, given the more objective nature of causation and severity, the legal currency of
Oncale and its emphasis on these two elements, and the practical necessity of article brevity, I am
focusing solely on causation and severity. For feminist discussion ofthe five elements, see Abrams,
supra note 86, at 1220-25.
99. See MeritorSav. Bank, FSB,477 U.S. at 59-61; see also Schwartz, supranote 84, at 1719
(stating that early sexual harassment case law relied on a "sexual-desire-based notion ofcausation").
100. See MeritorSav.Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 64. While in theory, the reference to "oppositesex" cases should recognize both male-on-female and female-on-male cases, because the discussion
of "opposite-sex" sexual discrimination is almost completely limited to cases of the male-on-female
variety, I will consistently use the term to refer only to male-on-female cases. For discussion of the
existence of female sexual harassers, see infra Part VII.C.
101. The "sex per se" rule had been adopted by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
See, e.g, Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001
(1998); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 805-06 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1996);
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[S]exual harassment is ordinarilybased on
sex. What else could it be based on?"); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3
(3d Cir. 1990). Such interpretation is seen as consistent with EEOC guidelines which define sexual
harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature" without any consideration of intent. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (a) (2004); see also Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1723-24 (describing the causation of
sexual harassment's chronological development from desire-based to sex-based).
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nontraditional cases became actionable. 2 The Seventh Circuit's Doe v.
City of Belleville is the most prominent.'0 3 Doe presented the case of twin
sixteen-year-old boys who were routinely targeted by their cemetery coworkers." ° After enduring threats of assault and insults such as "queer,"
"fag," and "bitch" for the duration of their two months of employment, the
two finally quit when one of the brothers had his testicles grabbed by a
fellow employee.0 5 While Doe presented a case of same-sex harassment,
the court reasoned that "so long as the environment itself is hostile," the
outcome should be no different than if the case had involved parties of the
opposite sex.'0 6 "Frankly, we find it hard to think of a situation in which
someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons entirely
unrelated to that person's gender."'0 7 "[W]hy the harassment was
perpetrated (sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided
humor? boredom?) is beside the point."'0 8
Admittedly, the deletion of intent may have been premised on a valid
observation in harassment cases. Harassment is unlike other forms of
employment discrimination in which evidence of discriminatory intent is
necessary to rebut a valid presumption that conduct having a
discriminatory impact may be the product of legitimate and rational
business decisions. 9 Because grabbing a co-worker's genitals fails to
serve any legitimate business function, the Doe court saw questioning
intent as superfluous." 0 Likewise, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., it did not matter that Lois Robinson's male colleagues did not show
any sexual interest in her."' It was sufficient that she was subjected to a

102. For extensive discussion and support of the sex per se standard, see generally Schwartz,
supranote 84 (discussing the evolution from sexual harassment claims that required a sexual-desire
based notion of causation to those that now only require a sex-based notion of causation).
103. See 119 F.3d 563. For further discussion of Doe, see Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale
Opinion: A PansexualResponse, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 1269, 1277 (1999). See also Schwartz,
supra note 84, at 1699-1700, 1725-28; Storrow, supranote 66, at 713-15. For interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision to vacate Doe, see infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
104. Doe, 119 F.3d at 566.
105. Id. at 566-67. Because the two boys did not want to tell their parents why they were
quitting, they initially gave two weeks notice. Id. at 567. However, the boys were unable to
complete their final two weeks. Id. Following the tendering of their resignation, the harassment
escalated. Id. With two days left, the boys finally had to quit when a firecracker was thrown at and
exploded in front of one of them. Id.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 580.
108. Id. at 578.
109. Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1717-18.
110. Id.
111. 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("[S]exual behavior directed at women will
raise the inference that the harassment is based on their sex."). For further discussion of the sex per
se analysis, see Drobac, supranote 103, at 1274-77; Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1699-1703, 1729.
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work environment in which she was surrounded by pornographic pictures
and lewd commentary." 2 The sex per se rule was not oversimplified, but
simply a basic insight.'l 3 "'[S]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex.
What else could it be based on?""'4
B. Causationand the Feminists
The leading feminists of sexual harassment's second generation did not
welcome the effective elimination of cause.' 15 With varying emphatic
stress points, each theorist rejects the focus on sexual behavior to the
exclusion of nonsexual behavior, notes the risk of female essentialism
implicitly lurking behind equating male sexual conduct with sexism, and
16
hopes a new standard will provide greater potential for same-sex cases."
Notwithstanding such common concerns, each work is inevitably distinctly
nuanced and offers a unique paradigm upon which cases of sexual
harassment should be determined. "7 Yet, despite the shared motivation to

112. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522.
113. See Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1724-25. Swartz writes that
[I]t would be a mistake to write off the sex per se rule as sloppy thinking or
judicial "laziness." The rule seems to be an advance over a sexual-desire-based
"but for" causation theory. There is a connection between the sex per se rule and
the conclusion, stated by many courts, that the specific motivation of a sexual
harasser should not matter. The worst that can be said is that the courts failed to
articulate a theoretical rationale for an important-and surely correct-insight.
Id. (footnote call numbers omitted).
114. Id. at 1724 & n.104 (quoting Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994)).
115. As noted earlier, the second generation of sexual harassment academics is identified with
Kathyrn Abrams, Anita Bernstein, Katherine M. Franke and Vicki Schultz. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. Unlike Abrams, Franke, and Schultz, Bernstein's thesis of replacing the
"reasonable person" with a standard of respect links her work more closely with the severity
element than the causation element. Consequently, I reserve discussion of her work for treatment
of the severity element. See infra Part VI.B (discussing Bernstein's work).
116. Abrams, supra note 86, at 1172 (trying to avoid essentialism by focusing on the
"gendered context and meaning of the conduct" of sexual harassment); Franke, supra note 65, at
696 (recognizing that both sexual and nonsexual behavior can be sexist and visited upon a victim
of the same or different sex in order to maintain the existing gender norms); Schultz, supra note 13,
at 1689-90 (rejecting the "sexual desire-dominance paradigm" due to its incapacity to recognize all
forms of gender harassment because of its foundation in patriarchy); see also Schwartz, supra note
84, at 1702, 1749-58 (synthesizing the three works' treatment of sexual conduct and essentialism).
117. Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1998) ("While the
nuances of these writers' approaches to sexual harassment differ, all emphasize that sexual
harassment is discrimination based on sex, not merely workplace behavior with sexual overtones.").
For discussion of each of the four theories, see infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing Abrams); infra Part
IV.B.2 (discussing Franke); infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing Schultz); infra Part VI.B (discussing
Bernstein).
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broaden the reach of sexual harassment law and the differing prescriptions
advanced, each work, either explicitly or implicitly, steadfastly reaffirms
that sexual harassment law must primarily focus on the subordination of
women."'8 The second generation of theorists successfully perpetuates the
feminist misspeak of the first.
1. Kathryn Abrams
Emphasizing the need to return to the "why" of sexual harassment,
Kathryn Abrams most explicitly rejects the causation elimination trend and
argues that sexual harassment law must maintain the feminist focus." 9 Her
reasoning is no less ambiguous. After years of being mired in defining
"what" acts or other behavior constitute harassment and "how" the Meritor
elements should be interpreted, sexual harassment law must recenter on the
motivation: "the institutionalization of women's subordination."' 20 With
a near-fatalistic dedication to subordination theory, Abrams defines sexual
harassment as a means of entrenching male norms, not only by directly
subordinating women by limiting their employment opportunities but also
by asserting "the primacy of male prerogatives" through less direct means
such as placing greater value on a "traditional" male work ethic and
accepting behavior between male employees such as trading sexual jokes,
pornography, or descriptions of personal sexual encounters in graphic
detail.' 2 ' Sexual harassment is thus defined as part of an "agonistic
workplace dynamic... [which] functions as a means of establishing male
control and expressing or perpetuating masculine norms in the
workplace."' 22 In emphasizing these less direct means of subordinating
women, Abrams hopes to appeal to staunch MacKinnonists by maintaining
a focus on subordination while increasing the means to include nonsexual
and less direct male behavior.'23 And in so expanding the theoretical base,
Abrams believes her account will strengthen the claims of female victims
while creating actionable same-sex cases for men who fail to personify

118. David Schwartz comes to a somewhat similar conclusion, at least in his review of the
works of Kathyrn Abrams, Katherine M. Franke, and Vicki Schultz. Schwartz, supra note 84, at
1704. However, despite recognizing the significance of feminism in the development of sexual
harassment law and Butler's official crowning of the four as the second generation, Schwartz denies
feminism's ongoing influence, believing the courts to be pursuing a "formal equality" approach.
Id.at 1700-02, 1775-76. Because I believe that feminism persists in its control of sexual harassment
law, as well as theory, I differ from Schwartz in my analysis of Oncale and subsequent cases as well
as to how sexual harassment law should ultimately develop.
119. See Abrams, supranote 86, at 1170-72, 1223.
120. See id. at 1171-72.
121. Id. at 1205-14.
122. Id. at 1205.
123. Id. at 1213-14.
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traditional masculinity and are targeted as part of the effort to maintain the
gender hierarchy.'24
2. Katherine Franke
Although for Abrams, making same-sex cases actionable seems to be
a positive, but somewhat unintended, consequence of her work, providing
a theory to expressly support male same-sex cases is clearly the stated
primary motivation for Katherine Franke. 25 Her theory, however, remains
unmistakably tied to defining sexual harassment in terms of female
subordination. Like Abrams, the trick is to expand our understanding of
the gender hierarchy and how it operates. So rather than limiting the gender
hierarchy's purpose solely to maintaining female inferiority, Franke
describes the social paradigm as designed to serve a dual purpose: to
produce "masculine men as (hetero)sexual subjects" and "feminine women
as (hetero)sexual objects.' ' 126 Recast in terms of such "hetero-patriarchal
127
objectives," the gender hierarchy victimizes both women and men.
Sexual harassment thus becomes a tool or a "technology of sexism" used
to implement such goals.121 Yet Franke acknowledges that the technology
is not evenly applied. 129 In male-on-female cases, harassment may be
experienced either as subordination or punishment for gender
nonconformity. 3 ° In MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, sexual desire
and abuse of power are understood as efforts to subordinate through
demands that a female employee serve at a man's pleasure.131 In Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., a male supervisor's hostile behavior toward a
female employee promoted to a job where sexiness was not a
qualification 132 is explained as an effort to punish and restore our

124. Id. at 1212.
125. Franke hopes that her theory can respond to two concerns: 1) explaining why sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination; and 2) recognizing male same-sex harassment cases.
Franke, supra note 65, at 694. That Franke's theory is contemplated only to extend to male samesex cases and not female cases is consistent with my general thesis that sexual harassment theory
remains confined to cases which can support a feminist subordination theme.
126. Id. at 763.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 693.
129. Id. at 769.
130. Id. at 763.
131. Id. at 766 (discussing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
132. 25 F.3d 1459, 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a woman working the genderneutral job of casino "floor person" was sexually harassed by a male supervisor through his
referring to the woman as a 'dumb fucking broad"' and "'fucking cunt,"' and telling her, "'You
are not a fucking floor man ....You are a fucking casino host ....Why don't you go in the
restaurant and suck their dicks... ?').

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

23

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 57,
2 [2005], Art. 1
LAWIss.
REVIEW
FLORIDA

(Vol. 57

patriarchal norms.' 3 3 But in male-on-male cases, the hetero-patriarchal
paradigm permits only cases of sexual conduct directed at gender
nonconformity. Thus, a sexual harassment case does not exist for a male
victim who is the object of his gay supervisor's desire.'34 Regardless of
how extensive the supervisor's abuse of power or how extensive the
victim's injuries, there is no sexual harassment. The case simply does not
fit the paradigm. The gay boss has not "policed, perpetuated or enforced"
the hetero-patriarchal norms; he has only evidenced his "carnal desires."' 35
In a similar vein, but even more candidly, Franke affirms that the
evidentiary standard in male-on-female and male-on-male cases can and
should be different. After eliminating the possibility of same-sex sexual
desire cases from the definition of sexual harassment, she then eliminates
same-sex cases of the "fraternity-type culture" because in such cases
sexual behavior, regardless of severity, is "merely" an instance of men
acting like boys.'3 6 To be "based on sex" in same-sex cases, a victim must
prove that the conduct was aimed at punishing gender nonconformity.3 7
Male-on-female cases require no such evidence. "Lest the reader draw the
wrong conclusion, allow me to state clearly that I believe it is appropriate,
efficient, and legitimate for courts to draw inferences of discrimination in
traditional different-sex harassment cases."' 38 It is these twin admissions
of theory and evidence which reveal that Franke's interest in same-sex
cases is overshadowed by feminist paradigmatic might. Male-on-female
cases (the effective extent of Franke's "different-sex" case definition) are
advantaged by recognizing that male behavior toward women, be it
described in terms of sexual desire or otherwise, is always dictated by the
hetero-patriarchal norms. Male-on-male cases begin with no such
presumption but must ultimately meet the same expectation by proving the

133. See Franke, supra note 65, at 764 (discussing Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1459).
134. Id. at 767-69. Recognizing this gap in her sexual harassment theory as an "inevitable,
intellectual moment when grand theory fails to provide a unifying and totalizing approach," Franke
suggests such cases may be actionable under Title VII as disparate treatment. Id. at 767. She also
later suggests general claims under tort, contract, and racketeering law for all cases which are
omitted from her theory. Id. at 769.
135. Id. at 767.
136. Id. at 767-68.
137. In the instance of straight harassers not motivated by a sexual interest in the victim,
Franke further divides this group into cases where the conduct complained of is not at first directed
at the victim but is just part of a fratemity-like male environment and cases where the conduct is
initially motivated by the male victim's failure to meet the masculine profile. Id. at 757-68. While
the second category of cases would immediately be recognizable as sexual harassment, the "Animal
House" scenario would become actionable only when the "enlightened man" indicated his
displeasure with the conduct, and the conduct, if continuing thereafter, could now be explained as
having a punitive dimension. Id. at 768-69.
138. Id. at 762.
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conduct is directed at maintaining traditional masculine norms.' 39 Or, put
another way, male-on-male harassment is acknowledged only to the extent
that it serves a model designed first and foremost to recognize the
institutionalization of female inferiority. Franke's model is upended, its
female subordination roots exposed.
3. Vicki Schultz
Like Franke's hetero-patriarchal norms, the "competence-centered"
paradigm built by Vicki Schultz claims to reframe the theory of sexual
harassment, but ultimately it remains built to suit the feminist agenda. 40
Schultz claims she is ready to move beyond the male sexuality as power
theme at the heart of the "sexual desire-dominance paradigm" that early
feminists built and successfully marketed to define the issues critical to
feminists.' Schultz characterizes prevailing feminist theory as having
both an "under" and "over" inclusive effect on sexual
harassment-underinclusive to the extent nonsexual conduct is not
considered in evaluating sexual harassment claims and overinclusive to the
extent sexual expression is always equated with oppression."' For Schultz,
"the core of the problem" is not the sexual nature of the conduct but its
intended discriminatory purpose and effect.'43 Consequently, a shift in
perspective is necessary to meet the true purpose of Title VII: "to empower
everyone-whatever their sex or gender-to pursue their life's work on
equal terms."'"
Yet despite such egalitarian introductions, Schultz's competencecentered theory is designed to serve women first and men as an
139. Id. at 769. Franke states:
[W]here a woman alleges that she has been sexually harassed by a man, a lower
quantum of proof is sufficient to trigger an inference of sex discrimination because
larger cultural norms of women as sex objects and men as sex subjects have been
reproduced in the offending conduct. In the same-sex context . . . the same
intuitions and larger cultural dynamics are not at work, therefore more information
is necessary in order to conclude that the conduct complained of is sex
discrimination, as opposed to some other form of nonsexist offensive behavior.
Id.
140. See Schultz, supranote 13, at 1692.
141. Id. at 1688.
142. Id. at 1689. While Schultz primarily focuses on the "underinclusive" criticism of
prevailing sexual harassment theory in ReconceptualizingSexual Harassment,see generally id.,
her later article is devoted to the "overinclusive" observation. See generallySchultz, supranote 84
(arguing that the sexual model is too broad and leads companies to prohibit a broad range of
relatively harmless sexual conduct).
143. Schultz, supranote 13, at 1688-89.
144. Id. at 1692 (emphasis added).
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unintentional and occasional second. While women have made significant
advances in the workplace, the workplace remains central to male identity
and superiority. For men, harassment fills a void left by equal opportunity
laws. "[H]arassment is not driven by a need for sexual domination but by
a desire to preserve favored lines of work as masculine."' 45 Schultz's
competence-centered paradigm intends to respond. It recognizes
harassment that "has the form and function of denigrating women's
competence for the purpose of keeping them away from male-dominated
jobs or incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers."'" As
additional evidence of the benefits of the competence-centered approach
and its commitment to women, Schultz further remarks that her theory
allows the employment positions of a man and woman involved in a sexual
harassment suit to be ignored, as, despite a woman's position of authority,
she may be undermined by men in an effort to preserve the workplace as
male sacrosanct.'47
Schultz's theory does not completely dismiss the possibility of male
victims. Yet, like Abrams, such a possibility is merely an afterthought.'48
As Schultz describes, male claims that qualify pursuant to the competencecentered approach are the "additional advantages."' 49 And like Franke, the
success of a male claim is predicated on its ability to conform to a
paradigm designed around the gender hierarchy of feminism. 5 ° This
expectation is set despite Schultz observing the theoretical possibility of
a male claim against a woman and cautioning against relying upon
published case statistics as evidence of the type of male cases filed.' 5 '
Schultz maintains that "the most prevalent" male cases arise because of the
victim's failure to meet the traditional masculine image.' 52 Like oppositesex cases involving female victims, in same-sex cases involving male
victims, harassment directed at unmanliness can be manifested by either
sexual or nonsexual conduct.'53 Yet predictably, male cases brought against
men or women based upon sexual desire rather than gender conformity

145. Id. at 1690.
146. Id. at 1755.
147. Id. ("This account provides a more comprehensive understanding of the customary cases
of male-female harassment by supervisors and coworkers and also allows us to understand some
less conventional forms of harassment, such as harassment of female supervisors by their male
subordinates.").
148. See supranotes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing Abrams's treatment of male
victims).
149. Schultz, supranote 13, at 1774.
150. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Franke's sexual harassment theory).
151. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1774 n.469. For further discussion of the limited probative
value of published statistics on sexual harassment and domestic violence, see infra Part VII.C.
152. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1774.
153. Id. at 1786-87.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/1

26

Hill:THE
The
Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment
FEMINIST MISSPEAK OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

fail. 154 Like Franke, this limitation for male victims is in clear contrast with
the recognition of similar cases involving female victims and male
offenders.155
In her conclusion, Schultz maintains that her competence-centered
approach ends the "two-tiered structure of causation" by acknowledging
the relevance of both sexual and nonsexual conduct. 5 6 However, despite
the progress of recognizing that both sexual and nonsexual conduct may
be "based on... sex," Schultz's competence-centered approach has not
completely jettisoned a two-tier model. Instead, it has replaced the clear
emphasis on sexual conduct and minimization of nonsexual conduct with
an emphasis on female claims and the minimization of male claims.
Schultz responds to the workplace of male privilege with a theory of
female privilege.
C. Causationand the Supreme Court
Like the second generation, the Oncale Court saw the need to respond
to and explicitly reject the emerging sex per se standard.'57 "We have never
held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and
women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the
' Yet beyond simply
words used have sexual content or connotations." 158
agreeing with the second generation's emphasis on causation, Oncale
endorsed a much more fundamental feminist position. Despite recognizing
the potential of same-sex discrimination and the necessity of substantiating
the charge of harassment "even" in cases between men and women, the
Supreme Court also accepted a presumption of heterosexuality.159 In so
doing, the Court lessened the evidentiary burden in the traditional
opposite-sex cases, while simultaneously demanding a much higher
standard of proof in same-sex cases."6 In this respect, while Oncale
affirms the second generation emphasis on causation, it also reaffirms the
much more fundamental feminist presumption that sexual harassment
theory is founded on male sexual power.
154. See id. at 1786 ("Thus, accusations ofand antagonism toward homosexuality are relevant,
but not because such actions signal anything about whether sexual desire is present between
harassers and harassees. They are relevant because antigay harassment frequently evidences gender
stereotyping.").
155. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing Franke's exclusion of a samesex/sexual desire argument for men).
156. Schultz, supra note 13, at 1801.
157. See Oncale v.Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
158. Id.at 80.
159. See id.
160. The immediately ensuing discussion relates to the unequal evidentiary burden on the
causation element for opposite-sex versus same-sex cases. For an examination of the evidentiary
burden's similar disparity on the severity element, see infra Part VI.A.
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Like Meritor's "[w]ithout question" acknowledgment that sexual
advances by men toward women are instances of sexual harassment, 61 the
Oncale Court accepted that it is "easy" to find causation in male-female
sexual harassment cases, as sexual activity in such cases is assumed to be
motivated by heterosexual desire. 62 By contrast, in same-sex cases, the
aggressor's homosexuality has to be proven before the "same chain of
inference" will be drawn between 6the
aggressor's sexual orientation and
3
the motivation for causing injury.1
The Court explained that, in addition to sexual desire, same-sex cases
also could be based on sexual conduct caused by a "general hostility"
toward a particular sex or specifically directed at one sex in a mixed-sex
environment.'"6 Initially, such suggestions of sexual desire, gender
hostility, or disparate treatment could have been interpreted as an
65
instructive discussion of causation, rather than as an exhaustive listing. 1
Yet, whatever Oncale's theoretical potential, the disappointing end to
Joseph Oncale's case as well as subsequent actions taken by the Supreme
Court and lower courts have destroyed any real hope for same-sex cases.
The Supreme Court acted immediately on its decision in Oncale,vacating
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Doe on the same day it issued Oncale. " Such
a decision could be regarded as further emphasizing that "because of... sex"

161. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
162. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 80-81. The basic causation tests of sexual desire, gender hostility, or disparate
treatment presumably also apply to opposite-sex cases, as the Oncale Court did not explicitly create
any distinctly opposite-sex criteria.
165. Several circuits have interpreted Oncale's suggestions as instructive. See, e.g., Rene v.
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (extending the Price
Waterhouse causation theory to same-sex cases), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (extending the Price Waterhouse
causation theory to same-sex cases, despite Doe being vacated); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp.,
168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing Oncale as instructive); Shermer v. Ill. Dep't of
Transp., 171 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).
Other circuit courts clearly have acknowledged Oncale as an exhaustive listing of causation
possibilities. See, e.g., McCown v. St. John's Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2003);
La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474,478 (5th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc.,
266 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2000).
For support of the exhaustive interpretation at the district level, see Dick v. Phone Directories
Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278-79 (D. Utah 2003). See also Bundenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.,
230 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1273-74 (D. Kan. 2002); Emesto v. Rubin, No. 97-4683, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21501, at *31-32 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1999).
166. Doe v. City ofBelleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacatedby 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
For discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision, see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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demands more than simply having sexual conduct. 67 Yet it has more
commonly been understood as an implicit rejection of the second generation's
theory thatDoeand cases like it were successful because they were recognized
as instances of effeminate men being harassed for failing to personify our
"hetero-patriarchal objectives."'6' This less generous interpretation of the
Supreme Court's action in Doe is also consistent with the Oncale Court's
failure to extend Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins's recognition of Title VII
claims based upon gender stereotyping in the opposite sex context to same-sex
cases.169 Reading Price Waterhousein combination with Oncale,one can only
conclude that an actionable harassment claim can be made by a woman for not
embodying the feminine mystique i 1lPrice Waterhouse, but a man cannot
similarly claim harassment caused by his nonmasculinity.'70
Faced with such judicial limitations, Oncale came to a predictable
finish. Oncale's harassers were not homosexual, nor were they motivated
by a hostility toward all men or in a position to disparately treat men, given

167. Despite this common interpretation that the Supreme Court's treatment of Doe effectively
ended the sex per se standard, some circuits have continued to suggest that causation can be
established in certain cases if the sexual conduct is of a severe, physical nature. See, e.g., Rene, 305
F.3d at 1063-64; Nguyen v. Buchart-Horn, Inc., No. 02-1998 section "C" (2), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12398, at *10 (E.D. La. July 15, 2003); Parrish v. Sollecito, 249 F. Supp. 2d 342, 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), reh'g denied, 253 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2003).
168. See Franke, supra note 65, at 763. For review of the second generation's interpretation
of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe, see supraPart IV.B. As discussed by Franke, at least three
male-on-male cases underwent an analysis similar to that imputed to the Seventh Circuit Doe
decision. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(involving harassment by male co-workers of a man with a learning disability and arrested cognitive
and emotional development); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tex.
1993) (involving a man harassed because would not engage in profane conversations), Goluszek
v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 11. 1988) (involving a shy man constantly teased about sex); see
Franke, supra note 65, at 763. For a recognition of the Supreme Court's decision to vacate Doe as
a rejection of the second generation's theory supporting the earlier Seventh Circuit's decision, see
Drobac, supra note 103, at 1277; Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1702-03, 1725.
169. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (holding that the plaintiff always must show that the
conduct constitutes ."discriminat[ion]. . .because of... sex') (alteration and omissions in
original); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing a Title VII claim for a
woman denied promotion based upon sex stereotyping but remanding to determine employer
liability based upon a preponderance standard that the employment decision would have been the
same without the gender consideration). Departing from the Supreme Court's implied position in
vacating Doe, several circuits have extended the Price Waterhouserationale to same-sex cases. See,
e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (extending
the Price Waterhouse causation theory to same-sex cases, despite Doe being vacated); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
170. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (recognizing a woman's claim based on gender
when an employer "acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive"). For various
individuals who have recognized a shortcoming in the Supreme Court's failure to extend Price
Waterhouseto the same-sex context, see, forexample, Drobac, supranote 103, at 1282-84; Schultz,
supranote 13, at 1777; Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1742-43.
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the all-male make-up of the oil rig crew. 171 Upon remand, Oncale's
employer moved for summary judgement for lack of cause, and the case
was quietly settled.172 Since Oncale, the majority of the courts have
similarly articulated a preference for staying within Oncale's"suggested"
boundaries. 173 Consequently, the Oncale standard
poses a difficult
174
challenge to establishing cause in same-sex cases.
The restoration of cause and the development of a same-sex theory had
been urged by the second generation feminists primarily as a means of
extending feminist theory through the argument that men as well as women
could be harassed for failing to conform to hetero-patriarchal objectives.' 75
While recognizing the actionability of same-sex cases, Oncale did not
follow the newly minted feminist course. Yet Oncaledid set a clear double
standard in favor of opposite-sex, male-on-female cases of harassment
over same-sex cases involving either gender. In that respect, it resounded
with the basic feminist theme, which the second generation had
maintained. Women are the true targets of sexual harassment. Male
superiority is the ultimate objective. And so the Court returned (if it ever
left) to the original feminist understanding of sexual harassment. Sexual
harassment is the means by which men exercise their sexual power against
women in the workplace in order to perpetuate and reinforce their social
dominance. The feminist misspeak of sexual harassment is enforced by
each of Oncale's three evidentiary routes.'76
V. THE FEMINIST MISSPEAK OF CAUSATION

A. Sexual Desire-Rizzo v. Sheahan
Of the three Oncalecausation possibilities, the courts have most openly
followed Oncale's cue toward recognizing a bias in favor of opposite-sex
cases when cause is established by sexual desire. With Oncale's
presumption that sexual desire in male-on-female cases is "easy to
draw,""' it is conversely understood that "without this presumption, a
same-sex harassment plaintiff needs other methods to prove that the
171. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
172. Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1735.
173. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' interpretation of
Oncale's causation discussion as exhaustive or instructive).
174. See infra Part V (examining the circuits' application of Oncale's causation standard).
175. See Franke, supra note 65, at 763.
176. In reviewing only the sexual desire, gender hostility, and disparate treatment tests of
causation, I am adhering to the prevailing exhaustive interpretation of Oncale. For a comparison
of the exhaustive versus instructive treatment by the various circuits, see supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
177. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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conduct was based on sex."' 78 Such proof is demanded in same-sex cases
which involve either men'79 or women,18 0 regardless of how physically
extreme the conduct. Struggling with the proof required to establish
homosexuality, two possibilities suggested in La Day v. Catalyst
Technology, Inc. are to recognize 1) the conduct as a sexual advance rather
than simply demeaning by looking at the nature of the specific acts, or 2)
the harasser as a homosexual based upon a history of making sexual
advances toward others of the same sex. 18 Such evidentiary routes are not
"easy,"2 as proven by the Ninth Circuit's unwillingness to find sexual
desire even when the male harasser's conduct included numerous incidents
of physically touching the male victim's crotch and anus.8 3 The difficulty
in proving sexual desire in same-sex cases becomes even more clear when
comparing how difficult it is to disprove sexual desire in male-on-female
cases.
Relying on three specific incidents of harassment, the female plaintiff
in Rizzo v. Sheahan claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her
immediate supervisor, a male assistant chief at the Illinois Cook County
Sheriff's Department.8 4 On two occasions, Rizzo's supervisor had told
Rizzo he would "like to fuck" Rizzo's fifteen-year-old daughter who he

178. McCown v. St. John's Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2003).
179. For proof of the aggressor's homosexuality in the male-on-male case, see, for example,
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
180. For proof of the aggressor's homosexuality in the female-on-female case, see, for
example, Dick v. PhoneDirectoriesCo., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1276-84 (D. Utah 2003) (granting
employer's motion for summary judgement based upon claimant's failure to prove her harassers'
homosexuality or that they were motivated by sexual desire, although the employer conceded the
"unusually raucous and vulgar" nature of the female harassers' conduct which included the
principle harasser pinching the breasts of the claimant and others, "bodily butt humping" women
in the workplace, and rubbing her foot in the crotch of female employees while making sexual
comments).
181. 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has allowed "the
connotations of sexual interest" to suggest homosexuality when the conduct included numerous
comments suggesting a desire to have sexual contact with the plaintiff. Shepherd v. Slater Steels
Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1279-80
(recognizing standards of same-sex/sexual desire set by the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits but
not by its own Tenth Circuit and choosing to follow the Fifth Circuit La Day test for same-sex
cases).
182. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (acknowledging the ease of inferring sexual desire in opposite-sex
cases).
183. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1207-09 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'den banc,
305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). Of course, on rehearing Rene ultimately followed a simpler path
which did not require proof of sexual desire as it allowed causation to be proven per se by the
sexual nature of the conduct. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068. For further discussion of Rene and the
ongoing use of a sex per se standard, see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
184. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2001) (raising both a hostile environment
and retaliation claim).
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had seen and thought attractive.'85 The final time, the supervisor "looked
Rizzo over" and suggestively told her he wished he was her husband.' 86
The court easily acknowledged that sexual comments made to a mother
regarding her daughter surpassed the severity of any comments that could
be personally directed at a plaintiff. 8 7 However, despite the ease in finding
severity, no causation could be established.' 88 While it was generally
acceptable to "deduce" causation in opposite-sex cases, "even where the
harassing behavior is not overtly gender based,"' 89 Rizzo presented a
"unique situation."' 9 ° Working against her own interests, the plaintiff had
inadvertently disproved causation by heavily documenting that the conduct
directed at her was a product of her supervisor's dislike for her husband.' 9'
Rather than seeing the sexual desire test of causation as evidence of
feminist bias, one might simply conclude it is a presumption based on a
nonfeminist societal observation. We are a predominantly heterosexual
society.' 92 Given our heterosexual predisposition, it is arguably another
valid judicial "insight" to perceive male-on-female sexual conduct as
motivated by sexual desire. 9' Yet no matter how overwhelming the
statistical evidence of our heterosexual inclination, why allow such a
presumption to favor one group of plaintiffs while clearly disfavoring the
other? Moreover, in assuming the greater likelihood that a person is
heterosexual, wouldn't proving a harasser's heterosexuality be an easy
burden---easier than proving his homosexuality? Considered as a relative
question, the judicial presumption seems to be more than innocuous
"laziness."' 94 It would not be difficult to set a standard that requires the
aggressor's heterosexuality or homosexuality to be shown by similar
indicia. For example, the La Day standard-allowing consideration of the
specific nature of the acts or recognition of the gender that is generally the
object of the aggressor's sexual advances-seems easily applicable to

185. Id. at 709.
186. Id.
187. Id. at712.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 713 (relying on the opposite sex/male-on-female case ofHaugerudv.Amery School
District,259 F.3d 678, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2001)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 712-13.
192. Contrary to the apparently common belief that one in ten people are homosexual, Time
Magazine reported that during its survey year only 2.7% of men and 1.3% of women had engaged
in homosexual sex. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Nowfor the Truth About Americans andSex, TIME, Oct.
17, 1994, at 62.
193. David Schwartz similarly justifies the sex per se rule as judicial "insight." Schwartz,
supra note 84, at 1724-25.
194. Id. at 1724 (quoting Franke, supra note 65, at 694 (discussing the sex per se rule)).
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proving heterosexual desire. 95 Adhering to a common standard for sexual
desire would right a legal imbalance, end the underlying favoritism for
opposite-sex cases, and reduce legitimate criticisms that proving sexual
desire in same-sex cases while not in opposite-sex cases perpetuates a
stigma of homosexuality, producing more negative legal consequences. 96
B. GenderHostility
1. Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions,Inc.
In pursuing Oncale's causation route of gender hostility, the
presumption in favor of opposite-sex cases is also evident. Two Fourth
Circuit opinions well illustrate this double standard. Sitting en banc in
2003, the Fourth Circuit held in Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions,Inc. that
the female plaintiff had been an individual target of harassment by her
male co-workers because of her sex.' 97 Finding for the female plaintiff, the
court relied upon the theory of gender hostility. 98 For her eighteen-month
tenure, Lisa Ocheltree was the lone woman amongst twelve employees
making shoes in Scollon's production shop.' 99 Reading Ocheltree, one
senses a workplace so permeated with obnoxious, highly offensive sexual
conduct that it could not be described without reference to such behavior.
Ocheltree was subjected to a "daily stream" of sexual discussion and
conduct, consisting of the male employees reporting on their sexual
activity and directing sexual insults or gestures at one another.200 Men
would describe how their wives and girlfriends "liked it from behind,"
"'gave good head," and "[let] it run down the side of her face."' 20 ' They
talked in graphic detail of anal sex, sex with dogs, and sex with young
boys.2 2 Ocheltree witnessed male employees using a female mannequin to
simulate sexual acts by pinching the mannequin's nipples, pretending to
engage in oral sex, or otherwise fondling it in a sexual manner.20 3 While
there was some factual dispute as to whether Ocheltree witnessed the male

195. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474,480 (5th Cir. 2002). For earlier discussion
of the La Day standard, see supra note 181 and accompanying text.
196. For discussion of the stigmatization of homosexuality by limiting proof of sexual
orientation to same-sex cases, see, forexample, Drobac, supra note 103, at 1280-81; Storrow, supra
note 66, at 718-21.
197. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004).
198. Id. at 331-33.
199. Id. at 328.
200. Id. at 328-29.
201. Id. at 329.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 328.
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employees' sex simulation with the mannequin on one or more occasions,
it was assumed that at least on one occasion, the conduct was prompted by
Ocheltree's presence. 2 On two other occasions, Ocheltree was also
believed to be individually targeted. In one incident, a male co-worker
approached Ocheltree singing, "Come to me, oh, baby come to me, your
breath smells like c[o]m[e] to me."2 °5 On another occasion, when the men
were looking at a book with pictures of men with pierced genitalia, one
man brought the book over to Ocheltree's work station and opened it to the
centerfold, asking her, "'[W]hat do you think?.' 2 06 Throughout her
employment, Ocheltree repeatedly made clear that
such behavior was
20 7
unwelcomed and attempted to notify her employer.
As the Ocheltree court reminded the parties, causation still must be
proven even if the hostile work environment elements of unwelcome
conduct, sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct, and employer liability
are satisfied.20 8 However, rather than following the Oncale Court's gender
hostility instruction mandating both a general need to show "'one
sex.., exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed ' ' 20 9 and a specific need
to "make it clear" that the conduct was motivated or caused by gender
hostility,210 nine members of the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
causation element was met without citing to any particular incidents.2 ' In
the majority's determination, it could simply be presumed that the sexual
conduct at Ocheltree's production shop was "particularly offensive ' 212
to
woman.
a
"as
Ocheltree
target
to
intended
therefore
was
women," and
The court reached this conclusion despite complaints made by three male
employees who were also offended by the conduct and despite men often
being the subject of the sexual behavior.2" 3 The court characterized the
204. While the majority accepted that Ocheltree was present for such conduct "[m]any times,"
pursuant to the testimony of a male shop employee, the dissent reported that Ocheltree personally
reported witnessing conduct with the mannequin on only one occasion. Compare id. at 328, with
id.at 339-40 (Williams, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
205. Id. at 328 (alteration in original).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 328, 330.
208. Id. at 331 (citing the four elements of sexual harassment based on hostile work
environment (relying on Spicer v. Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). For
further discussion of the basic sexual harassment elements, see supranote 98 and accompanying
text.
209. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
210. Id.at80-81.
211. Disagreeing with the majority, one judge concurred specifically because be felt causation
could be evidenced only through reliance on the three particular incidents directed at the plaintiff.
Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 336 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
212. Id. at 332.
213. Id. at 339 (Williams, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
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male harassers' personal sexual conduct reports as intended solely to be
"demeaning" towards women because the discussed wives and girlfriends
(who had engaged in214
consensual sexual behavior) were portrayed as
"sexually subordinate." As recognized by the lone dissentingjudge, such
a characterization clearly demonstrates a level of paternalism and prudery
toward women, their sexual desires, and their freedom.215
2. Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
The Fourth Circuit's ease in finding causation and its favoritism for
opposite-sex cases becomes even more telling when comparing Ocheltree
to the court's earlier decision in the same-sex case of Lack v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.21 6 Again, causation was principally based upon the theory of
gender hostility.2" 7 Yet, unlike the treatment of Ocheltree, the burden 21
of8
proving causation was placed squarely on the same-sex plaintiff.
Predictably, the Lack plaintiff was unable to meet his burden.219

214. Id. at 332. In so doing, the court neatly avoided having to grapple with the equal
opportunity harasser defense. However, in the same-sex context, the Fourth Circuit had previously
recognized that the harassment of both sexes does not preclude either sex from raising a valid
sexual harassment claim but simply presents "an imposing obstacle." Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
240 F.3d 255,262 (4th Cir. 2001). For further discussion of the equal opportunity harasser defense,
see, for example, Drobac, supra note 103, at 1279; Schwartz, supra note 84, at 1739-42.
215. In Ocheltree, the lone dissenter stated:
[I]n modem times, there is nothing particularly derogatory, demeaning, or
subservient about a woman participating in consensual heterosexual sex. As
women have sought and achieved sexual equality in this society, and as moral
beliefs and taboos about oral sex have broken down, it seems illogical to assert
that comments about consensual sex between adults necessarily imply male
dominance or power.
...To conclude that these conversations portray women in derogatory terms
simply because they depict women engaging in consensual heterosexual sex would
be, I believe, to misapply the Supreme Court's teaching on the relationship
between sexual conversations and sexual harassment and to misunderstand
modem societal views regarding women's sexuality.
335 F.3d at 342 (Williams, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
216. 240 F.3d at 255. Rather than relying directly on Title VII, Lack's claim was brought
under the sexual harassment provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Id. at 257 (citing
W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -5-11-20 (2000)). The development of such legislation is recognized to
be dependent upon its federal counterpart, as evidenced by the court's reliance on Oncale to find
the state statute's protection against same-sex harassment. Id. at 257, 260. In addition to raising
hostile environment, Lack also raised a version of Title VII's quid pro quo claim through West
Virginia's analogous retaliation sexual harassment provision. Id. at 259 n.5. However, each claim
was denied for failure to prove causation based on sex. Id. at 260.
217. Id. at 257. An effort to base the case on sexual desire was also denied. Id. at 261.
218. Id. at 257,261.
219. Id. at 261.
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Like Ocheltree, Lack's case was based upon general workplace
conditions created by his male supervisor as well as specific incidents in
which Lack was individually targeted.2 ' Lack was derisively charged by
his supervisor with "'F-ing the cashiers;"' told in front of a customer "'I
need a small bag, and not the one between your legs, please;"' made to
endure his supervisor saying "'I'm coming' or 'I'm coming for you' in a
'real sexual' tone" whenever Lack called him for customer assistance; and
subjected to his supervisor making motions as if to unzip his pants to
engage in sex with Lack.221 On one occasion the supervisor grabbed his
crotch and said "'[H]ey, Chris, here is your Christmas present. ' '222 The
Wal-Mart supervisor also liked to make sexual comments and jokes;
engage in "juvenile wordplay" through such verbal turns as "'penis butter
and jelly sandwiches,"' ".'oh my rod,"' and "'spank me very much;"' and
stand behind customers when he "'liked what he saw... and act like he
was just going to grab their behind right there. '"223
Again, as in Ocheltree, causation was the deciding element. 4 Yet,
rather than drawing presumptions of gender hostility as in the male-onfemale context, the Lack court stressed "the causation element poses an
especially formidable obstacle in same-sex harassment cases.' ' 25 The
same-sex plaintiff could not simply rely on the sex-specific nature of the
226
conduct, even though the conduct was directed at him personally.
Instead, Lack was expected to produce "plausible evidence that such
comments were animated by [his supervisor's] hostility to Lack as a
man. "227 Ocheltree assumed that talk of consensual sexual acts between
men and women subordinates women and thereby maligned the female
plaintiff.2 28 In same-sex cases, "[f]acially sexual remarks must be evaluated
according to their common usage. 22 9 In stark contrast to the opposite-sex
context, when such sexual remarks are made between men they do not
carry a sexual connotation, even if accompanied by crotch-grabbing or
some other sexual gesture.230
220. Id. at 258.
221. Id.
222. Id. (alterations in original).
223. Id.
224. Id.at 260 n.6. While Wal-Mart conceded both employer liability and that the conduct was
unwelcome, it contested both the causation and severity elements. Id. at 260. By finding lack of
causation, the court did not have to reach the element of severity. Id. at 260 n.6. For general
discussion of the four sexual harassment elements, see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
225. Lack, 240 F.3d at 260.
226. Id. at 261.
227. Id.
228. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004).
229. Lack, 240 F.3d at 261 n.8.
230. Id. (relying on Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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A comparison of Ocheltree's and Lack's treatment of gender hostility
causation openly reveals a version of female as sexual victim learned from
traditional feminist teachings. 231 By contrast, men and women in the same' of causation. The
sex context must overcome the "formidable obstacle"232
inconsistency and underlying presumptions are problematic for both samesex and opposite-sex cases. Same-sex cases are viewed with a presumptive
suspicion that male-on-male sexual behavior is never directed at the
plaintiffs sex in either a sexual or hostile manner. Such resistance is
exacerbated by the ease in establishing the opposite-sex case. And while
the feminist presumptions may assist an individual female plaintiff in her
opposite-sex case, they are loaded with all the belittling attitudes of women
for which feminism has been attacked.233
C. DisparateTreatment-EEOCv. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc.
In a similar manner, Oncale's prescription of causation based on
disparate treatment of the genders has been distorted by feminist theory in
favor of establishing causation in male-on-female cases. As the Oncale
case itself made clear, a disparate treatment claim necessitates "a mixedsex workplace. 234 Consequently, Oncale was precluded from relying upon
this causation claim, as he worked on an all-male oil rig. 235 Yet, beyond
such practical limitations, through creative judicial interpretation of what
comprises the "workplace" and who works there, courts have also been
able to theoretically eliminate male victims from raising a disparate
treatment claim. By contrast, no such judicial contortions occur in
opposite-sex cases.
EEOCv.Harbert-Yeargin,Inc. is an interesting illustration.236 The case
presented the claims of two men, Joseph Carlton and Cedric Woods, who
were employed by Harbert-Yeargin, a company providing maintenance
services to construction sites. 23 Each man alleged to have been subjected
23
to "unwanted touching, poking, and prodding in their genital areas. 1
While the Sixth Circuit upheld a grant in favor of the employer's motion

231. For a discussion of the persisting victimization theme of feminism, see supraParts II.D.F.
232. Lack, 240 F.3d at 260.
233. For a discussion of such traditional criticisms of feminism, see supra Parts II.D.-E. For
a further discussion of the harms of current sexual harassment theory for men and women, see infra
Part VII.
234. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
235. Id. at 77. For further discussion of Oncale and its treatment on remand, see supra
Part IV.C.
236. 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001).
237. Id. at 500-01.
238. Id. at 501.
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for judgment as a matter of law in Woods's case due to lack of employer
notice, in Carlton's case, the district court's decision to deny the
company's motion forjudgment as a matter of law was reversed on appeal
due to the victim's failure to prove causation.239 Cartlon's causation
argument was premised on the existence of a mixed-sex workplace. 24 ° Of
the 292 people employed at the Harbert-Yeargin facility during the relevant
timeframe, only three were women.241 Each of these women testified that
she had daily contact with the construction workers, and none of the men,
including Louis Davis, who was Carlton's primary harasser, ever acted in
a sexually offensive manner toward her.242 Yet, despite a company policy
against "unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature," Louis Davis and
"various [other] supervisors" engaged in the daily practice of "goosing"
male employees.243 In addition to Carlton and Woods, who testified to
personally having Davis grab their crotches on numerous occasions, 2" at
least three other male employees confirmed the practice generally and
testified that Davis would "grab various employees' buttocks and crotches"
and "even twisted [one employee's] nipples., 245 The practice of goosing
men, but not women, was apparently such a workplace standard that Davis
and another supervisor came forward and admitted to grabbing male
employees in intimate areas while adamantly denying they acted in any
remotely similar manner toward the female employees.246
For the district court and the EEOC, the strictly male focus of the
sexual behavior combined with the company's employment of both sexes,
regardless of the proportions or manner in which they were employed, was
sufficient to establish disparate treatment.2 47 Reversing the lower holdings,
the Sixth Circuit instead chose to reason in rhyme, relying on Mother
Goose's authority:
Georgie Porgie pudding and pie
Goosed the men and made them cry
239. In a somewhat confusing set ofopinions caused by a split concurring opinion, the opinion
of Judge Gilman affirming the district court's decision to grant the company's motion in Woods's
case is the majority opinion, id. at 500-01, 517-18, while the opinion of Judge Guy reversing the
district court's decision to deny the company's motion in Carlton's case controls. Id. at 519 n.1,
519-23 (Guy, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 503.
242. Id. (recognizing no offensive verbal or physical conduct directed at the female
employees).
243. Id. As the case described, "'[g]oosing' consisted of getting grabbed, patted, or prodded
in the buttocks or genitals." Id.
244. Id. at 501-03 (summarizing the testimony of Carlton and Woods).
245. Id. at 503.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 505-06.
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Upon the women he laid no hand
So it cost his employer 300 grand.2 48
Harbert-Yearginsimply presented the Sixth Circuit with the "classic
example of men behaving badly. 2 49 Such behavior is not actionable under
Title VH. 250 Noting that harassment was a form of discrimination, the court
emphasized that the establishment of causation in same-sex cases was
made by showing "predatory homosexual conduct ' 211 or that the harasser
was "motivated by a general hostility to men in the workplace."252 Such an
emphasis on Oncale's first two causation routes implied a de-emphasis on
disparate treatment in same-sex cases. The Sixth Circuit's definition of the
workplace furthered this limitation of the disparate treatment option.
Regardless of the existence of women and a sexually-offensive practice
geared solely toward men, the disproportionate presence of men to women
made it a single sex workplace where, by definition, disparate treatment
simply could not occur.25 3 If such efforts did not make the court's
reservations regarding same-sex cases clear enough, its last comment was
succinctly revealing: "Same-sex sexual harassment cases of this nature
present a slippery slope, and this case either goes over the edge or comes
so close to it that a line needs254to be drawn. If not, what's next-towel
snapping in the locker room?
Like the Supreme Court's assurance in Oncale that allowing same-sex
cases would not lead to actionable harassment charges when a coach
smacks a professional football player on the buttocks, 2 " the Sixth Circuit's
towel-snapping comment went to the heart of its concern. In each case, the
examples raised were for the purpose ofacknowledging that such behavior
is not offensive when perpetrated by a man against a man. Consequently,
in each case, the comments were more directly relevant to the question of
severity than to the question of causation.256 Yet, by reversing the denial
of the company's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of
failure to prove causation,257 the Harbert-Yeargin decision has a more

248. Id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Id. at 522 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Such comments are
reminiscent of Franke's "boys will be boys" dismissal of male-on-male sexual conduct. Franke,
supra note 65, at 767-68. For further discussion of Franke, see supra Part IV.B.2.
250. Harbert-Yeargin,Inc., 266 F.3d at 522 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting forms of relief beyond Title VII).
251. See id. at 519 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Id. at 521 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. Id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. Id. at 522 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
256. For my discussion of the severity element of sexual harassment, see infra Part VI.A.
257. Harbert-Yeargin,Inc., 266 F.3d at 520-23.
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lasting and detrimental impact on same-sex cases. Harbert-Yeargin
circumscribes the disparate treatment classification in same-sex cases,
making no effort to draw similar limits on opposite-sex cases.
Certainly in many opposite-sex cases, the question of a mixed-sex
workplace will never arise, as the sex of the two parties to the case alone
satisfies the standard. Yet, what if rather than goosing any of HarbertYeargin's 288 men, Davis had goosed one or all of the three female
employees? 258 Certainly, the disparate treatment claim would be pursued
unimpeded by any arguments that the workplace was not mixed-sex. The
Sixth Circuit conceded as much through its rhyming on the equal
opportunity gooser, noting that the case would fail due to the lack of
disparate treatment rather than the lack of a mixed-sex workplace. 25 9 By
restricting disparate treatment only in the instance of same-sex plaintiffs,
causation is once again perverted.
VI. THE FEMINIST MISSPEAK OF SEVERITY

A. The Reasonable Woman and the Courts
As it had done with causation, Meritor acknowledged but did little to
develop the severity element. "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
260
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'
Such limited instruction predictably provided a terrific opportunity for
circuits, the result was the development of the
circuit deviation. In many
"reasonable woman., 26' The reasonable woman of severity is feminism
personified. Yet, despite her controversial nature, the Supreme Court,
through Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.262 and Oncale,2 63 has accepted and
possibly endorsed her existence. 26
Originally, Meritor'slimited severity discussion raised the question of
whether the test of severity focused on the nature of the harasser's conduct
or on the nature of the victim's harm. While Harris replied that the
conduct, not the harm, is the critical focus (at least to the extent that no
severe psychological harm is necessary), it left a critical question

258. In total, of Harbert-Yeargin's 292 employees, only three were women. Id at 503.
259. Id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For further discussion of
the equal opportunity defense, see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
260. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)) (alterations in original).
261. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
262. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
263. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
264. See Harris,510 U.S. at 22-23; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75; infra text accompanying notes
282-83.
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unanswered: what conduct meets the test of "severe or pervasive?"265
more precisely, who decides what conduct meets the test of "severe or
pervasive?"
In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit responded with the "reasonable
woman."26' 6 Justifying her creation, the Ninth Circuit relied upon a
legislative intent rationale. The inclusion of "sex" in Title VII was
intended to "prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of
degradation which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities
' With the male cast as aggressor and the female as victim,
for women."267
the feminist conclusion was inevitable. Because women are the only
victims, only their perspective on harassment is relevant. 268 The
aggressor's view, or more accurately, the man's view, is not acceptable.269
Men and women simply differ in their views of what conduct is
offensive.27 ° Without a female viewpoint enforced by law, men will
continue to make "'great figure' or "'nice legs"' comments, and no
offense to women would ever be legally acknowledged. 27 ' By adhering to
a male standard, "the prevailing level of discrimination" would simply be
reinforced.272 Likewise, the "sex-blind reasonable person standard" is also
indefensible, given its tendency toward male bias and systematic failure to
recognize the experiences of women.273
Envisioning the reasonable woman, the Ninth Circuit bestowed upon
her all the traditional feminist beliefs. The workplace, an extension of our
patriarchal society, is under male control.274 Sexual harassment is the
means by which men reinforce their control. 275 The reasonable person

265. See Harris,510 U.S. at 22-23. For further discussion of the non-necessity of establishing
severe psychological harm, see infra notes 282 and accompanying text.
266. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
267. Id. at 881 (quoting Andrews v. City ofPhiladelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Of course, what common legislative intent, if any, Congress had in passing Title VII with its
inclusion of sex is questionable, given its last minute nature and the motivations surrounding its
inclusion. See supra notes 63, 75 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's legislative history).
268. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79.
269. Id. at 879.
270. Id. at 878.
271. Id. (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 879. For further discussion of gender neutrality, see supra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the reasonable person standard and its criticism by
feminists, see infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text (discussing Bernstein's criticism of the
reasonable person standard in sexual harassment law).
274. For the feminist depiction of the workplace, see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
275. For the feminist definition ofsexual harassment, see supranotes 67-73 and accompanying
text.
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standard further protects the status quo by masking a male perspective.276
Following feminist theory, Ellison supports the basic feminist assertion
that to truly protect women, the entire patriarchal model and all its
deceptively neutral, self-perpetuating devices, including those operating in
sexual harassment law, must be rejected.277
Ellison insists that core differences between men and women and the
"common concerns" women share justify adopting a feminist standard.278
Yet, in trying to avoid the inevitable essentialism critique,279 the court
20
exposed its acceptance of the woman as sexual victim tenet of feminism.
"We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a
group, but... because women are disproportionately victims of rape and
have a stronger incentive to be concerned with
sexual assault, women
28
sexual behavior.,

1

While Harris discussed "severity" in terms of a reasonable person, its
emphasis on answering the limited question of whether severity requires
a showing of severe psychological harm has allowed the reasonable

276. For the feminist discovery of the reasonable man lurking behind the reasonable person,
see, for example, Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the
Reasonable Woman StandardAnother Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195, 211-12 (2001);
supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
277. For discussion of feminism's patriarchal theme, see supra Part II.
278. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 ("We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among
women as a group, but we believe that many women share common concerns which men do not
necessarily share."). For explicit feminist support of the reasonable woman standard, see, for
example, Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and in Practice,77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1415 (1992) (supporting the reasonable
woman standard as it "centers and values women's experiences"); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational
Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1175-82 (1995) (adopting a
"rational woman" standard based on a victim's economic assessment ofher employment choices);
Kerns, supra note 276, at 196-97 (arguing for the reasonable woman standard because victims of
sexual harassment are predominantly female, women are injured more than men, and sexual
harassment is not a gender-neutral problem).
279. See, e.g., Cahn, supranote 278, at 1415-16 (ultimately accepting the reasonable woman
standard despite its reminiscence of "earlier dominant images of white middle class women" and
its failure to account for the experiences of all women); Kerns, supra note 276, at 225 ("Even if
feminists celebrate the individual differences between women, feminists cannot turn a blind eye to
the societal factors that bond women."). For general discussion of the essentialist critique of
feminism, see supraPart II.D.
280. For clear support of the reasonable woman standard because of a belief that women are
"under a constant threat of sex-related violence," see, for example, Kerns, supra note 276, at 215.
For recognition of this as a weakness in the reasonable woman standard, see, for example, Sharon
J. Bittner, Note, The Reasonable Woman StandardAfter Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The
Debate Rages On, 16 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 127, 135-36 (1994) (charging that the reasonable
woman standard treats women as "sensitive, delicate, and in need of protection in the workplace").
For general recognition of feminism's woman as a sexual victim, see supra Part II.D.
281. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
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woman to endure.282 Oncale also implicitly encourages its use. In turning
its attention from the causation element of Title VII, the Oncale Court
emphasized severity as a "crucial" element intended to prevent Title VII
' Yet despite this reassurance,
from becoming a "general civility code."283
Oncale's review of harassment in its "social context ' ' 14 protects and
perhaps endorses the reasonable woman. Oncale stressed reviewing the
"constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships" instead of focusing simply on "the words used or the
physical acts performed."'285 Oncale also further refined Harris's
reasonable person, requiring her to be placed in the "plaintiff's position"
before the question of severity could be answered.286 However, because it
'
and their
is only after recognizing women's "common concerns"287
distinction from male interests that a female plaintiff's position can truly
be understood, Oncale implicitly transformed the reasonable person into
the reasonable woman.

282. While the Ellison decision preceded Harris'srejection of a test of harm, it is noted that
Harrisalso spoke of the severity test from the perspective of the "reasonable person":
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title ViI's purview. Likewise, ifthe victim does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII
violation.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
Yet, because Harrisalso emphasized that its decision was not intended to answer all questions
raised regarding severity, Harrisis understood as limited to rejecting the harm focus, at least to the
extent of holding that no severe psychological harm is necessary. Id. at 22-23 ("This [test] is not,
and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. We need not answer today all the
potential questions it raises .... "). For support of this narrow interpretation of Harris,see, for
example, Ann Juliano & Stewart J.Schwab, The Sweep ofSexual HarassmentCases, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 548, 582 (2001). See also BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: 1997 SUPPLEMENT 48 (1997); Kerns, supranote 276, at 20608. For support of a broader interpretation of Harris, see, for example, Gillming v. Simmons
Industries, 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996) (relying on Harris to support a jury instruction
regarding use of the reasonable person, not reasonable woman perspective for determining hostile
environment).
283. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) ("We have always
regarded [severity] as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake
ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual
flirtation-for discriminatory 'conditions of employment."').
284. Id.
285. Id. at 81-82.
286. Id. at 82.
287. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

43

Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAWREVIEW
57, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
FLORIDA

[Vol. 57

Such a transformation has occurred before. In the Sixth Circuit, a
similar social context test288 was clarified within a year to encompass the
reasonable woman.289 Moreover, since Harris and Oncale, the feminist
reasonable woman continues to be accepted.29 Despite feminist
protestations and postmodern posturing, feminists continue to advance a
severity standard deferential to the reasonable woman.
B. The Reasonable Woman andAnita Bernstein
Anita Bernstein's TreatingSexual Harassmentwith Respect 9 ' follows
such a course. Bernstein's work is motivated by her frustration with the
limits of reason. For Bernstein, reason rightly can be applied to questions
regarding rational behavior that surround acts of waste, imprudence,
negligence, recklessness, excessiveness, or inadequacy.292 Yet reason is of
little assistance in answering the more aesthetic question of offensiveness
raised in cases of harassment.293 Respect is the offered alternative.294

288. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (evaluating the
actionability of sexual harassment based upon "the personality of the plaintiff and the prevailing
work environment").
289. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) ("In a sexual harassment case
involving a male supervisor's harassment of a female subordinate, it seems only reasonable that the
person standing in the shoes of the employee should be 'the reasonable woman .... '). For further
comparison of Rabidue and Yates, see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 282, at 585 n. 144.
290. Apart from the Ninth Circuit, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits
allow or at least have not clearly rejected the reasonable woman since Harriswas decided. As noted
below, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in several of these cases, thereby arguably
condoning the use of the reasonable woman. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301
F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625,632 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,522
U.S. 997 (1997); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 718 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1128 (1998); Hixson v. Norfolk S. Ry., No. 94-5832, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
15421, at *10 (6th Cir. 1996); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994);
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1082 (1995) ("Ellison unequivocally directs us to consider what is offensive and hostile to a
reasonable woman."); King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For discussion of
the circuits which have clearly rejected the reasonable woman standard, see infra note 324 and
accompanying text.
For further discussion of circuit support for the reasonable woman, see, for example,
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 282, at 46 n.82; Kerns, supra note 276, at 206 & n.53; Sexual
Harassment:Introduction,supranote 66, at 730 & n.83; Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable
Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 633,
637-38 (2002).
291. Bernstein, supra note 63.
292. Id. at 450.
293. In making this point and in coming to her standard of respect, Professor Bernstein relies
upon Justice Scalia's inability to define "abusive" or "hostile" in terms of reason in the sexual
harassment and obscenity contexts and his suggested "man oftolerably good taste" in the obscenity
context. Id. at 448-50 (discussing Scalia's concurring opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
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Unlike reason, Bernstein argues that respect can be used to evaluate both
the conduct of the harasser and the reaction of the complainant. 295 For
Bernstein, the respectful person has many attractive features. As an initial
matter, Bernstein recognizes respect's origin in reason and thus hopes that
the adoption of respect will not be viewed as a quantum judicial leap. 296 In
conformance with the liberal state, Bernstein adds to respect's acceptability
quotient by characterizing respect as a negative duty.297 The potential
harasser or agent is commanded to "forbear""29 if the act would (1) treat the
would-be victim or object solely as a means to an end, (2) humiliate the
object, 299 or (3) violate the object's personhood. ° °
So framed, Bernstein argues that treating sexual harassment with
respect also protects the "equality and autonomy" of the harasser, as his
actions are limited only by the "equality and autonomy" of the other.3"'
Yet, as is so often remarked of liberalism, the harmonic balance of equality
and autonomy is impossible to achieve. 0 2 Resonating in feminist theory,
such criticisms are the basis for destroying liberalism's claim of neutrality
and exposing liberalism as a paradigm geared to protect power-wielding
men at the expense of powerless women.3 3 Bernstein's theory of respect
meets the same tragic fate. A balance of respect for both the freedom of the
agent and the freedom of the object can not be had. Yet, rather than
building a theory to serve the agentor the harasser as liberalism is charged
with doing under the guise of neutrality, Bernstein's theory serves the
object or the victim when conflict arises between the parties' interests.
510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993)).
294. Id. at 450.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 482-83 (discussing respect as defined by the work of Immanuel Kant).
297. Id. at 486-87.
298. Id. at 486.
299. Id. at 489-91.
300. Id. at 491-92.
301. Id. at 492.
302. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 126 (1969) ("[I]t remains true that
the freedom of some must at times be curtailed to secure the freedom of others. Upon what principle
should this be done? If freedom is a sacred, untouchable value, there can be no such principle.");
see also JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 43 (1996) (recognizing Berlin's conflict between liberty and
equality); F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUION OF LIBERTY 424 n.21 (Henry Regnery Co. 1972) (1960)
(quoting John Dewey's remark, "[i]f freedom is combined with a reasonable amount ofequality and
security is taken to mean cultural and moral security and also material safety, I do not think that
security is compatible with anything but freedom"); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 503-06 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1835, 1840)
(explaining democratic nations' preference forequality over liberty when the choice must inevitably
be made).
303. For further discussion of feminism's general critique of liberalism's neutrality, see supra
notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
304. For the reasonable man lurking behind the reasonable person, see supra notes 21-29 and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

45

Florida Law Review,
Vol. LAWREVIEW
57, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
FLORIDA

[Vol. 57

Such an imbalance is clear from the victim's perspective, which is taken
to define respect. Respect is defined in terms of using the victim,
humiliating the victim, or violating the victim's personhood. °5 Put more
succinctly, respect "originates in a trait of the object, respect makes its own
demands."3 6
Although Bernstein defends her respectful person standard as genderneutral,30 7 it is her skepticism about the plausibility of such neutrality that
is key to her dismissal of the reasonable person and raises further questions
about how neutral the respectful person truly is. Consistent with other
feminist critics, Bernstein observes there is likely not now, nor has there
ever been, a reasonable person.30 8 While in his best moments the
reasonable person may be a "cipher,"30 9 Bernstein stresses that "legal
scholars agree that the reasonable person began life as the reasonable man
and retains some of his masculine aspect."31 Apart from only thinly
masking the reasonable man, Bernstein's other principal argument is that
the reasonable person is at best a superficially universalist standard subject
to such "particularistic and oppressive" ideologies31' as "pluralism,"3 2
"isolation and depoliticization, 313 and "assumption of risk and
consensus." 3 4 While pluralism's tolerance prevents attaching any real
definition to sexual harassment, Bernstein's criticism of the remaining
ideologies is premised on the finding that men are the dominant group.3 15
accompanying text (discussion of general feminist theory) and infra notes 309-16 and
accompanying text (Bernstein's acknowledgment ofthe reasonable man's use in neutral standards).
305. See supra notes 291-301 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of respect).
306. Bernstein, supra note 63, at 485 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 455 ("In contrast to the gendered pedigree of the reasonable person and the
gendered slant of both 'reasonableness' and 'reasonable woman,' the respectful person comes close
to gender neutrality.").
308. Id. at 466.
309. Id. at 467.
310. Id. at 466 (relying on GUIDo CALABREsi, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw22-

23 (1985)); see also Hilary Allen, One Lawfor All ReasonablePersons?, 16 INT'L J. Soc. L. 419,
422-24 (1988); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGALEDUC.
3, 22-23 (1988); Ronald K.L. Collins, Language,History and the Legal Process:A Profile of the
"Reasonable Man ", 8 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 311, 317-20, 323 (1976); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 846 (1991); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's
Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57-63 (1989); Caroline Forell, Essentialism,
Empathy, and the Reasonable Women, 1994 ILL. L. REV. 769, 773-74; Wendy Parker, The
Reasonable Person:A Gendered Concept?, 23 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 105, 105-06, 110

(1993).
For further feminist criticism of the reasonable person, see supra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text.
311. Bernstein, supra note 63, at 467.
312. Id. at 467-68.
313. Id. at468-69.
314. Id. at 469-70.
315. Id. at 467-68.
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Because men impose their majority view, women are effectively isolated
or forced to surrender to the consensus.316 Consequently, male control of
the reasonable person is pervasive throughout her arguments.
Compare such remarks with Bernstein's sympathy for the reasonable
woman. Bernstein sees the reasonable woman for all her essentialist
flaws,3 17 her inability to be applied in practice by male judges or male
jurors,318 her reinforcement of macho men and weak women stereotypes,319
and her overly subjective nature.32 ° Yet for all her faults, Bernstein remains
attracted to the reasonable woman's victim-oriented perspective. Given
that objectivity or a reasonable person can not be achieved, Bernstein
suggests that use of the subjective reasonable woman standard may be the
lesser of two evils when the evaluation is limited to determining which
standard more accurately defines sexual harassment.32 1 It is outside
concerns, such as the objective "traditions" of the United States legal
system and the predicted, over-exaggerated public ridicule of the
reasonable woman, that ultimately force Bernstein to concede her
infeasibility. 22 So rather than attempting to fine-tune the reasonable
woman and having to confront her admitted weaknesses, Bernstein
salvages her redeeming attributes and makes a fresh start, giving her
respectful person the reasonable woman's victim-oriented perspective.323
Bernstein's theory thus becomes another means to mount the feminist
campaign in sexual harassment theory.
Certainly, many jurisdictions3 24 and feminists3 25 have rejected the
reasonable woman standard, citing Bernstein's concerns of victimization,
316. Id. at468-70.
317. See id. at 473.
318. Id. at 474-75.
319. Id. at475-77.
320. Id. at 477.
321. Id. at 481-82.
322. Id. at 482.
323. In reviewing the efforts of others to "tinker" with the reasonable woman, Bernstein's
principal concern is that such efforts further the subjectivity critiques. Id. at 477-80.
324. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have sufficiently compared the reasonable
woman with the reasonable person standard to evidence a clear rejection of the reasonable woman.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11 th Cir. 1999); Bunch v. Shalala, No.
94-2269, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27275, at *25 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995); DeAngelis v. El Paso
Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,594 (5th Cir. 1995). For circuit support of the reasonable
woman, see supra note 290 and accompanying text.
In a systematic review of every federal district and appellate court decision on sexual
harassment for the 1986-1996 period, two individuals concluded that the reasonable woman
standard is receiving little court application. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 282, at 582-85.
325. See, e.g., Bittner, supra note 280, at 135-37 (arguing against the reasonable woman
standard as it exculpates male behavior, is paternalistic toward women, perpetuates negative female
stereotypes, complicates the law, takes the focus away from the harasser's conduct, and is
unnecessary to providing a remedy).
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essentialism, and judicial neutrality. Yet, the reasonable woman's rejection
by some does not discount her continuing influence or her tolerated
acceptance by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the influence of the
reasonable woman on the question of severity must be considered in
combination with the feminist biases underlying the interpretation of
causation. It is only in taking this broader perspective, rather than
maintaining a more myopic focus on any particular element of sexual
harassment, that feminism's pervasive influence on sexual harassment
comes into full view.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE FEMINIST MISSPEAK

A. The Injury to Women
As both whispered and shouted by sexual harassment law and theory,
the implications of the feminist misspeak are far-reaching. Women are
perhaps the most visibly impacted. As core feminist principles persist in
legal decisions and in the writings of rising generations of feminist
scholars, so do the dangers of feminism.326 The patriarchal premise of
feminism continues to essentialize and victimize women, preventing
women from achieving an equal rank in the workplace and perpetuating
the general state of disparity that feminism strives to end.3 27
Post-Harrisand post-Oncale,these traditional critiques of feminism are
magnified. Having spoken directly on causation and severity, the Supreme
Court has endorsed a favoritism for female claimants, at least to the extent
that their claims are against men. It is reasonable to assume that such a
condoned bias has naturally spread, for it is impossible to conceive of a
test or ajudge that could allow feminist teachings to influence one element
while pursuing a standard of neutrality otherwise.
The feminist misspeak also negatively affects both men and women
who are raising same-sex claims. Application of Oncale's causation
options of sexual desire, gender animus, or disparate treatment began with
the Supreme Court's direction to presume sexual desire in opposite-sex
cases, thus immediately putting same-sex cases in a less favorable
position."' Such regard has translated into a suspicion of same-sex cases

326. For discussion of feminist's influence on recent sexual harassment case law, see supra
notes 74-114, 145-63, 244-72 and accompanying text. For discussion of feminist's influence on
recent sexual harassment theory, see supra Parts III.A, IV.B, VI.B (discussing the works of
MacKinnon, Abrams, Franke, Schultz, and Bernstein).
327. For discussion of such criticisms within general feminist theory, see supra notes 45-53
and accompanying text. For discussion of such criticisms within feminist sexual harassment theory,
see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
328. For discussion ofthe disparate treatment ofsame-sex and opposite-sex cases on the sexual
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throughout the causation elements. Like the challenge posed to a same-sex
claimant by the difficulty of proving a harasser's homosexuality or sexual
desire, he is required to prove gender hostility while such is presumed for
the opposite-sex claimant.329 The Supreme Court's decision to vacate and
remand Doe upon deciding Oncale33° is consistent with this biased
direction. While Price Waterhouse accepted the nonconformity with
traditional gender roles theory for a female claimant harassed by men, the
Supreme Court's failure to see the parallel argument for male claimants
harassed by men curtails the gender hostility theory in the same-sex
context. 331 In a similar fashion, same-sex claimants are often foreclosed
from arguing disparate treatment to the extent that the workplace does not
employ in actuality or is not judicially defined as employing both sexes.3 32
Whether by factual or legal definition, no such disadvantage restricts the
opposite-sex claimant.
The severity element is also less generous to men and women in the
same-sex context. Once one acknowledges the continuing influence of the
reasonable woman, it is easy to appreciate how same-sex claimants are
placed at a comparable disadvantage.333 The reasonable woman is shaped
by her fear of the male sex and her recognition of his power over her.
Judicial sensitivity towards such feelings naturally helps a woman charging
sexual harassment by a man. Since such presumptive sympathies have no
relevance in same-sex cases, a same-sex claimant is implicitly held to a
higher severity standard.
B. The Injury to Men
Yet the negative impact of the feminist bias extends to affect all male
victims, regardless of whether they are raising same-sex or opposite-sex
complaints. This is a result of the reasonable woman's complementary
partner, the reasonable man. In contrast to the weak woman who demands
protection, the reasonable man is strong, incapable of feeling pain. 334 The
reasonable woman, thus, forces the severity threshhold to be set much

desire element of causation, see supra Part V.A.
329. For discussion of the disparate treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex cases on the
causation element of gender hostility, see supra Part V.B.
330. Doe v. CityofBelleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacatedby 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
For further discussion of Doe, see supra notes 103-10, 155-57 and accompanying text.
331. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-51 (1989). For further discussion
of Price Waterhouse, see supranotes 169-70 and accompanying text.
332. For discussion of the disparate treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex cases on the
causation element of disparate treatment, see supra Part V.C.
333. For discussion of the reasonable woman standard and its varying degrees of acceptance,
see supra Part VI.A.
334. Bernstein, supranote 63, at 476-77.
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higher for the male victim. At least one court has admitted to this thinking,
characterizing a male claimant as "hypersensitive" for reacting when his
supervisor told him he should take a Coca-Cola bottle and "'stick it up
[his] ass." 335
C. The Significance of Male Injury to Men and to Women
Such arguments may seem persuasive in theory. However, raising a
concern about male sexual harassment victims, particularly in the oppositesex context, may also appear insignificant as a practical matter. In 2002,
approximately eighty-five percent of the sexual harassment charges filed
with the EEOC were made by women.3 36 Moreover, only one percent of
sexual harassment claims involved male victims and female aggressors.33 7
Consequently, one might conclude that any feminist bias in the legal
standard does little, if any, actual harm. Of course, such an argument
ignores the injury done to women generally by the feminist bias. 338 But
focusing solely on the concern raised on behalf of men is not
inconsequential. Sexual harassment victims, regardless of their sex, are
reluctant to come forward. 339 Fear of further retaliation and stigma, shame,
company loyalty, and the costs ofpublic litigation challenge any victim, no
matter how strong the claim. Such difficulties are compounded for the
male victim. Aware of a prejudicial standard and the even greater
likelihood of incredulous treatment and stigmatization, men are even less
likely than women to come forward. Real men don't get sexually harassed.
Imagine if similar statistics were relied upon to discount the prevalence
of women's claims. While women are almost equally represented in the
private workforce34 ° and substantially, if not equally represented in the

335. Hannah v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 89-0699, 1991 WL 34363, at *5-6 (E.D.
Pa. 1991). Hannah,a same-sex case involving heterosexual men, was decided prior to Oncale. Had
Hannah been decided after Oncale it would have been more easily dismissed simply for lack of
causation. For further discussion of Hannah,see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supranote 282, at 47 n.87.
For a discussion of Oncale and the difficulties of proving causation in the same-sex context, see
supra Part IV.
336. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Sexual HarassmentCharges:EEOC &
FEPAs Combined: FY 1992-FY2003, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harasss.html (last visited Feb.
15, 2005).
337. Kerns, supra note 276, at 199 n.22.
338. For further discussion of the harm inflicted on women by the feminist bias of sexual
harassment, see supranotes 326-34 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, As FederalBias Cases Drop, Workers Take up the Fight,
N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 12, 1997, at 1.
340. In 2001, women comprised 47.2% of the private workforce. U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, OccupationalEmployment in PrivateIndustry by Race/Ethnic Group/Sex,
andby Industry, UnitedStates, 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2001/national.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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federal workforce,34 ' the relatively small number of sexual harassment
claims could lead to the argument that sexual harassment really is not a
problem for women."' Yet, like domestic violence, when women are the
victims of sexual harassment at work we quickly recognize the
underreported nature of the crime, citing all the reasons just discussed.34 3
We willingly disregard litigation figures as indicators of the prevalence of
percent
sexual harassment, relying instead on the statistic that fifty-three
34
harassed.
sexually
been
have
to
claim
women
of working
Drawing on these lessons learned through assisting female victims both
in the domestic violence and sexual harassment contexts should be a help,
not a hindrance, to male victims.345 Rather than dismissing the relatively
small percentage of male sexual harassment cases, we should remark on
the nearly fifty percent increase in cases involving male victims in the past
ten years and acknowledge that the number of men coming forward
increases as public and legal stigmas decrease. 3" As we "explode" the
private/public distinction for women, men should concomitantly enjoy
greater legal protections.347

341. In 2002, women comprised 42.43% of the federal workforce. U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, PartI: Employment ofMinorities, Women, andPeople with Disabilities,at
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fsp2002/partl.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
342. In 2002, 12,251 sexual harassment claims were filed with the EEOC by women. U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supranote 336. Only 246 Title VII litigation claims were
filed by the EEOC on behalf of men and women combined. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 Through FY 2003, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
343. See supra note 338 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that victims of sexual
harassment may be reticent). Similar to the sexual harassment victim's fear, shame, company
loyalty, and cost concerns, the domestic violence victim is recognized to be deterred by fear, shame,
love of spouse, and costs. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 891-92 (1992) (acknowledging the underreporting by women of domestic violence). For
further discussion of a domestic violence victim's difficulty in leaving an abusive relationship, see
Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
303, 308-21 (1997) (discussing the compounded difficulties battered women who are immigrants
confront); Kelly, Storiesfrom the Front, supranote 1, at 674-82.
344. See Kerns, supra note 276, at 199. Of course, underreporting concerns may make us
inclined to believe that the fifty-three percent statistic still does not fully account for all the women
who experience sexual harassment.
345. See generally Kelly, Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Violence, supra note I
(arguing for recognition of female domestic violence and greater assistance for male victims).
346. In FY 1992, men filed 9.1% of the EEOC sexual harassment claims. By FY 2002, men
were responsible for 14.9% of such claims. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra
note 336.
347. See MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 100. For further discussion of the private/public
dichotomy, see supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CORRECTING THE MISSPEAK

If we accept at this point that men and women can benefit from
addressing the feminist bias of sexual harassment law, we still face some
difficult questions. Why does such a bias exist, particularly if it risks
perpetuating negative stereotypes of women?34 And perhaps more
critically, how should the law be changed?
A. In Theory: Honest Answers
Answering the first question provides insight to the second. In feminist
theory, sexual harassment is the public counterpart to domestic violence.
Each are, by definition, perpetrated by men for one purpose: to maintain
control.3 49 And in protecting such a position, men rely upon their most
fundamental physical means: sexual power.35° Sexual harassment is thus
"[t]he executive's alternative to rape."'351 As a result of this connection
between sexual harassment and core feminist doctrine, to challenge the
patriarchal premise of sexual harassment law is to challenge the legitimacy
of feminism.
More practical reasons may also explain feminism's tenacious hold on
sexual harassment. Accepting the very disproportionate rate at which
women claim sexual harassment claims as an accurate reflection of
harassment may lead some to sincerely conclude that women were
originally, are now, and should remain the focus of Title VIl's sexual
harassment protection.352 Others may be practically motivated by less
sincere considerations. As in domestic violence law, the female advantage
in sexual harassment may be a vindictive perk, secured by women for
enduring a history of discrimination.353
348. For a discussion of the essentializing and victimizing of women through existing sexual
harassment law, see supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.
349. For my extensive discussion of the feminist need to maintain a patriarchal definition of
domestic violence theory because the male use of physical and sexual violence is critical to all
aspects of feminist theory, see Kelly, Disabusingthe Definition of Domestic Abuse, supra note 1,
at 817-20. For discussion of the patriarchy of sexual harassment theory, see supra Part IV.
350. See supranotes 326-27 and accompanying text (discussing feminism and the importance
of sexual intercourse).
351. Sexual Harassment,Introduction, supranote 66, at 727 (quoting Caryl Rivers, Sexual
Harassment: The Executive's Alternative to Rape, MOTHER JONES, June 1978, at 21).
352. Such an argument resonates in the concerns of domestic violence advocates who worry
about the loss of funding for domestic violence centers and projects dedicated to women and their
desire to maintain the focus on women who are perceived to suffer greater injury from domestic
violence. See Kelly, Disabusingthe Definition of Domestic Abuse, supra note 1, at 820-22.
353. Murray Straus argues that it is "not feminist critiques, but justifications of violence by
women in the guise of feminism, which controls domestic violence theory." Murray A. Straus,
PhysicalAssaults by Wives: A Major Social Problem, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE (Richard Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); see also Kelly, Disabusing the
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Reforming sexual harassment law does not necessitate dismissing the
legitimate aspects of these concerns. An individual may engage in sexual
harassment to secure or maintain a position of power and control. But this
desire for power may be felt both by men and by women. And it may arise
without any interest in perpetuating a societal patriarchal scheme.
Questioning the feminist bias leads to the important recognition that sexual
harassment may occur absent any type of power motivation and may, in
be an act motivated by other emotions such as fear or
some 35
instances,
4
anger.
B. In Practice:Objectivity Renewed
What effect results from eliminating the feminist misspeak of sexual
harassment? As a matter of causation, recognizing the feminist bias does
not render the Supreme Court's causation trio inoperable.355 Instead, it
frees the test from bias and levels the burden of proof for all claimants. To
the extent that individuals asserting sexual harassment will have to prove
a sexual desire motivation regardless of the sex of either of the two
litigants, the favoritism for female victims in opposite-sex cases is
removed. Moreover, ending the bias will allow the cases of female and
male victims to be considered fairly without any contrived efforts to limit
the gender hostility and disparate treatment options.
Similarly, testing severity within its "social context" as Oncale
directs3 56 does not have to lead inevitably to characterizations of helpless
women and macho men. In fact, rather than interpreting Oncale as
supporting such stereotypes, the argument could shift to emphasizing that
Oncale'srepeated remarks regarding objectivity preclude such labeling.3 57
The essentialism concern, which is immediately raised in reaction to such
stereotyping, reminds us that women and men do not all neatly mirror their
models.358 This oft-repeated refrain becomes more compelling after the
damage done to women and men by such stereotypes is considered. It
simply can not be assumed that any woman or man, even if subject to
Definition of Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 822 n. 133.
354. For fuller discussion of the controversial raising of such non-patriarchal explanations in
the domestic violence arena, see Kelly, Disabusingthe DefinitionofDomestic Violence, supranote
1, at 852.
355. While going beyond Oncale'sthree-part causation test is certainly a legitimate position
in reforming sexual harassment law, I have chosen to stay within the Oncale framework in this Part
to remain consistent with my earlier analysis of the extent of current feminist influence on the law.
For such discussion, see supra notes 165, 176 and accompanying text.
356. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
357. Within its two-paragraph discussion of severity, Oncale remarked on the need for
objectivity three times. Id. at 81-82.
358. For further discussions of the essentialism concerns raised in the context of the severity
element of sexual harassment, see supra note 327 and accompanying text.
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harassment, identifies with such images. Consequently, the endorsement
of such images, even ifjust in a limited number of cases, risks ignoring the
objective demand of severity and slipping too far into subjectivity.
Moreover, the victim's personal voice is already heard in establishing the
harassment element of "unwelcome" behavior.359 Maintaining severity as
an objective standard thus does not render the law of sexual harassment
devoid of subjective considerations but rather sets the proper balance.
IX. CONCLUSION

The advances of feminism should never be minimized or forgotten.
Throughout its succeeding forms and theories, feminism has remained
dedicated to gender equality. Feminism's contribution to sexual
harassment similarly must be recognized. Feminism named the violence
of sexual harassment. Feminism achieved its legal prohibition. Yet to truly
recognize the freedom of women and men, the ubiquity of patriarchy
cannot be presumed. Certainly, in many instances, sexual harassment may
still be motivated by a desire to maintain this traditional societal
framework. And certainly, in other instances, other means, such as
domestic violence or rape, may be similarly motivated. Such inequality can
never be tolerated. But the real intolerance must be directed at the
behavior. Sexual harassment, like domestic violence, rape, or any other
intimate abuse, is unacceptable regardless of the motivation. To truly end
sexual harassment, the feminist misspeak must end. This change, in turn,
will bring the true equality feminism seeks. Ending patriarchy necessitates
ending the feminist misspeak of sexual harassment.

359. For further discussion of the "unwelcome" element of sexual harassment, see supra note
98 and accompanying text.
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